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THE COMMUNITY ASPECT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP
NADAV SHOKED∗
ABSTRACT
This Article advances a new understanding of property rights by introducing the concept
of the community aspect of private ownership. Unlike traditional accounts, which assign
property rights to the individual owner alone, this Article argues that property rights should
be conceived as held by the individual owner in partnership with her immediate community.
The neighborhood within which a residential property is located holds a limited interest in
that property. The Article reaches this conclusion following a discerning reading of the
prevalent theories of property law. As they have so far mostly failed to acknowledge this
community aspect of ownership, writers in these diverse traditions have not been able to
provide a conceptualization of ownership that will correspond to their theories’ own premises. Through the prism of the community aspect of ownership, this Article thus provides not
only a more accurate notion of ownership, but also a better view of the contending philosophies of property. In addition, this Article suggests a legal reform that will promote the
community aspect of ownership by stabilizing neighborhoods experiencing rapid change in
the form of either abandonment or gentrification. Finally, this Article examines the ways in
which its proposed community-invested idea of ownership can be applied to problems in
other fields of property, torts, and intellectual property law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“For the quality of owning freezes you forever into ‘I,’ and cuts you off
forever from the ‘we.’ ” John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath.1
On September 22, 1988, the City of Chicago issued a rezoning ordinance revising the land uses allowed on a parcel of land where an
abandoned factory stood. The ordinance permitted commercialresidential planned development.2 Maria Rodriguez, who lived nearby
in a building she owned, should have been thrilled. Everyone predicted an increase in property values following the development—
a true windfall for Ms. Rodriguez. 3 Nevertheless, Ms. Rodriguez
did not view the ordinance as a blessing. Quite the opposite; she
chose to go to court, arguing that the ordinance was a deprivation of
her property in violation of the Illinois Constitution’s substantive due
process guarantees.4
How so? If anything, her private property rights appeared to have
been enhanced, as real estate values were to increase. Yet Ms. Rodriguez was looking beyond this traditional perception of enhancement
and deprivation of private property rights. She understood her property right as implying a broader entitlement; as being more than a
mere economic private endowment. For Ms. Rodriguez, her private
property right contained a community component without which it
would lose much of its value. The rezoning ordinance was putting at
risk that important element of her right. She feared the governmental act would entail a change in her community, offsetting any monetary gain brought about by the increase in the property’s market
value. She believed that the rise in property values following the rezoning would generate higher rents and property taxes leading to
1.
2.
3.
4.

JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 152 (centennial ed. 2002).
Rodriguez v. Henderson, 578 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
Id.
Id. (citing ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2).
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residents’ displacement, thereby changing the local social fabric.
Similarly, she worried that higher taxes might force her to move.
Though she would sell her house at a profit, she would not be able to
recreate elsewhere the atmosphere of her old neighborhood. By thus
potentially transforming the community, the ordinance could decrease her subjective valuation of her land, even though it did not
touch her parcel or injure the parcel’s objective valuation.
Such an argument strikes legal observers as novel, perhaps too
novel. The Illinois trial court dismissed Ms. Rodriguez’s complaint,
noting that it was “unaware of precedent which would recognize an
increase in the property value as an injury” to an owner.5 But the
state appellate court was undeterred by the unconventionality of the
legal challenge, and it reversed the decision.6 It explained that “even
if [Ms. Rodriguez’s] property might experience net dollar value increases, theoretically realizable in the future,” 7 she would suffer
harms, “including destruction of . . . neighborhood social and commercial fabric.”8 Accordingly the court concluded that she had stated
a constitutional claim.
In so doing, the Illinois Appellate Court implicitly recognized the
community aspect of an owner’s property right. The Illinois Constitution mandates due process of law when a person is “deprived of . . .
property.”9 Ms. Rodriguez was not deprived of her property under any
traditional understanding of the terms “deprivation” or “property.”10
The building was not confiscated, nor did it lose value.11 Regardless,
as the court understood, her holdings were being altered in an irreversible way. This alteration was as troubling as any other damage
5. Id. at 60.
6. Id. at 66.
7. Id. at 63.
8. Id. at 64.
9. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
10. Neither was her property “taken,” as this latter term is normally used and understood in constitutional takings clauses. The Illinois Constitution employs the term in its
eminent domain clause. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“Private property shall not be taken . . .
for public use without just compensation.”). The term and its common legal meaning are
not irrelevant for due process analysis since American courts have not always clearly distinguished the takings test from the due process test when reviewing zoning ordinances. To
find that a zoning ordinance violated substantive due process rights the Illinois courts
require a showing that the enactment was “arbitrary, capricious and unrelated to the public morals, safety and general welfare.” Mercer Lumber Cos. v. Vill. of Glencoe, 60 N.E.2d
913, 916 (Ill. 1945). This test closely traces the federal standard, set by the Supreme Court
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). That landmark decision
blurred the lines between due process and takings. See Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due
Process Tests and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 899, 906-07 (2007).
The ambiguity persisted for decades, even though takings jurisprudence appeared to have
emerged as an independent body of law a few years earlier. The starting point for modern
takings jurisprudence is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
11. On the importance of loss of economic value in takings jurisprudence, see Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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the government could inflict on her land. While maybe not directly
invading Ms. Rodriguez’s own private property, the government action was impinging on her community. The Illinois ruling stands for
the idea that the value of the individual piece of private property is
intertwined with the value of the surrounding community. This Article will argue that property law theory should embrace this view.
Owning property means more than owning land and walls. It denotes
owning specific land and walls, which other lands and walls, owned by
others, surround.12 Owning land is owning a part of a specific community. Removal of the community, just like removal of the land and
walls, alters the nature of the property right. It does so in a different
way that might be perceived as less intrusive, but it does so nonetheless.
Ownership contains a community aspect, and this aspect of ownership is not merely an attribute of an owner’s right that should be
shielded from arbitrary government interference in the manner envisioned by the Illinois court. The community aspect of ownership is
much more meaningful than that. Ms. Rodriguez’s story illustrates
this point nicely, for it did not end in the courts, where Ms. Rodriguez
won the battle. Unfortunately, on her neighborhood’s streets, she
probably lost the campaign. Her neighborhood, West Town,13 was to
become the focal point for gentrification processes: households’ median income soared by more than 50%, and the median home value
rose 176%.14 The neighborhood’s racial composition exhibited a clear
trend of change: the non-Latino white population increased from
27.4% to 39.39%, as the percentage of persons of Latino origin decreased from 59% to 46.85%.15 Latino homeowners were squeezed out
as the assessed value of their properties for tax purposes increased
dramatically.16 Thanks to all these developments West Town ended
up extolled as the equivalent of New York City’s SoHo; 17 unfortunately, this eventuality was in all likelihood the exact outcome Ms.
12. Lee Anne Fennell coined the very useful and accurate term “the unbounded
home.” The home has come unbound since threats to its value originate from events and
conditions that lie outside the parcel’s boundaries and never cross those boundaries in a
physical sense. Fennell mostly focuses on threats to the house’s objective monetary value.
LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES
13, 25 (2009).
13. The decision does not specify the location of the property, but it does include the
address of the rezoned factory, which is nearby. It is within the West Town neighborhood.
14. See David Mendell & Darnell Little, Rich ‘90s Failed to Lift All: Income Disparity
Between Races Widened Greatly, Census Analysis Shows, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 2002,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-08-20/news/0208200185_1_median-household-incomewhites-blacks.
15. U. ILL. AT CHI. NATHALIE P. VOORHEES CENTER FOR NEIGHBORHOOD AND
COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT, GENTRIFICATION IN WEST TOWN: CONTESTED GROUND 20 (2001).
16. A case study of one home owned by a Latino family shows consistent increases,
including a jump in assessed value of 117% between 1995 and 1996 alone. Id. at 17.
17. John J. Betancur, The Politics of Gentrification: The Case of West Town in Chicago,
37 URB. AFF. REV. 780, 792 (2002). For more on gentrification in West Town, see id.
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Rodriguez was dreading. It must have been an interference with the
community aspect of her ownership: a stark decrease in her property
right’s subjective value.18 Yet the state court, which had identified
such harm as a deprivation of property, could not have come to her
rescue this time around. Its decision introduced a remedy applicable
where the cause of harm was a specific governmental decision;19 but
here, the harm was generated mainly by the cumulative effect of private decisions made by Ms. Rodriguez’s neighbors—a decision to sell
their houses to gentrifiers and leave. The court was willing to act
when there was state action: it addressed the problem within the
contours of public law; but the underlying problem is broader than
that—it extends to private law as well.
The fact that Ms. Rodriguez could find no legal redress for the
diminution in her property right is a problem for property law. It also
presents a challenge for the way we think about what property rights
mean. This specific—though rather widespread—predicament endured by Ms. Rodriguez and her neighbors should propel us to engage a broader review of our theories of property. This Article will
answer that call by highlighting the community aspect of ownership,
thereby enriching our understanding of ownership as a concept and a
legal institution. The time is ripe for such an intervention since the
scholarly debate over the nature of property rights and their social
role has recently gained much needed momentum.20
Yet, until it acknowledges the community aspect of ownership,
this normative discussion will remain lacking. The action taken by
the Illinois court was a bold move in recognizing the community
aspect of ownership; still it was merely a first, and insufficient, step.
In order for the community aspect of property to exist and benefit
owners, it must also burden owners and limit their freedom. For Ms.
Rodriguez to be able to safeguard the stable community that allowed
her to enjoy her property, curtailing governmental powers was obviously not enough. Recognizing her neighbors’—and her own—
obligations created by the community interest in property is, as this
Article will explain, necessary.

18. For details on racial conflicts and outrage of the Latino community, see U. ILL. AT
CHI., supra note 15.
19. For examples of earlier such proposals, see Frank I. Michelman, Property as a
Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981) and Richard Lewis, Destruction
of Community, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 365 (1986).
20. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY
(2000); LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER (2003);
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531
(2005); Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517 (2003); Michael A.
Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1193-94 (1999); Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
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The right to a stable community carries a correlative duty on
community members, i.e., the opposite of an unlimited freedom to
move out.21 Lee Ann Fennell explains that while property within a
neighborhood can be divided into individually owned units, important
aspects of neighborhood life (e.g. “atmosphere” and greenbelts) are
not amenable to being parceled out. 22 Thus, as she argues, the
neighborhood has both privately owned elements and elements held
in common by all neighbors and it should be viewed as a semicommons.23 This very valid point can—and should—be carried further.
Even the supposed privately owned elements of the community (i.e.
individual parcels and structures) contain elements held in common.
The concept of the community aspect of ownership, as promoted by
this Article, holds that private property rights, normally perceived as
belonging to the individual owner alone, are in fact held by the owner
in partnership with the surrounding immediate community. In this
partnership, the owner is by far the senior partner—her stake in the
land is much greater than the neighborhood’s. Still, other members of
the community hold an interest in the individual homes of their
counterparts, as the latter affect their enjoyment of their own homes.
A private owner has a right to expect the law to protect her property
interests, and the community has a right to expect the same. The
community interest in ownership, and the community itself, cannot
be obliterated without hindrance. The neighborhood’s interest in the
properties of residents entails the maintenance, at least to some degree, of community stability, even at the cost of making it more burdensome for owners to exercise their freedom to sell their properties
and leave.
This community interest in ownership should be introduced since
it is a natural outgrowth of our thinking about property. As long as
we do not recognize it, the property rules we adopt fail to serve their
function. They treat a right that is inherently social as if it were a
mere individual entitlement, independent, in its enjoyment, promise,
and setbacks, from the surroundings. Commonly, it is assumed that
this is only true if communitarian or relational conceptions of property law’s role are adopted. These approaches highlight property
rights’ contextual and social nature.24 When read in this fashion, it is
easy to detect in property rights a community aspect. Yet property is
not always interpreted in this way. For some theories of property,
property is all about the individual and her independence from soci-

21. On rights and their correlatives, see Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-44 (1913).
22. FENNELL, supra note 12, at 55, 64.
23. On semicommon property rights, see Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property
Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000).
24. See infra Sections II.A and II.C.4.
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ety. According to such worldviews, property stands for privacy, for
the ability to detach oneself from others’ desires and pursue idiosyncratic preferences.25 Still it is the thesis of this Article that even in
reliance on such individualistic theories of property the community’s
stake in private ownership cannot be ignored. Even without assuming that society predates private property, or that the community’s
existence is an objective good, the community should be viewed as
owning a stake in an individual’s private property. Recognizing this
element of ownership entails a certain role for property rules: property law should do more to stabilize communities so that the community aspect of a given property is preserved.
In order to make this argument, Part II will analyze the competing theories that account for the existence of property rights and will
demonstrate why law should recognize the community interest inherent to property rights. The first theory to be examined will be
communitarianism, under which the case for the community aspect
of property is the easiest to make. Afterwards, I will move to theories
that at first blush appear less hospitable to my argument, examining
utilitarian and right-based arguments. The objective of the exercise
made in Part II is to illustrate how these diverse theories can all justify, and even necessitate, the recognition of the community interest
in property. It follows that it is not the goal of Part II, or of this Article as a whole, to pass judgment on the merits of these rival theories
of property.
By the same token, the reader need not adopt all of the perspectives presented in Part II in order to accept my conclusion. On the
contrary, Part II aims at proving that be one’s preferred theoretical
approach to property as it may, she should seriously consider the existence of the community aspect of private property. In this regard
this Article assumes an approach that differs from that embraced by
most property theorists whose work is reviewed in Part II. Adherents
of competing schools of thought normally write with the aim of refuting their counterparts’ theories. They thus focus on the polarities between theories. In this Article, I will rather try to bridge the gap between the different theories. I will demonstrate that, despite their
many important contrasts, and mostly without even realizing it,
these theories share common grounds with regards to the interplay of
community and ownership. Without renouncing their own tenets or
claims at exclusivity and superiority, the disparate theories should
embrace an understanding of property that includes a community
aspect. In order to make this argument in a coherent and persuasive
manner Part II will introduce the contending theories with some detail.
Those well versed in the relevant literature might naturally prefer to
25. See infra Sections II.B and II.C.1-3.
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read the more general segments of the discussion less closely and focus on the more particularized treatment of the community aspect.
To better understand the meaning of this proposed community
aspect, I will supplement the theoretical discussion with a practical
one. Part III will explain how the new understanding of the essence
of property emerging from Part II should affect property law. As one
possible application I will put forward a novel approach for tackling
rapid neighborhood change—in the form of gentrification or abandonment—relying on varied legal tools including local taxation, rent
control, and the provision of municipal services. Part III will thereby
address the problem faced by Ms. Rodriguez and the many others
whose plight as owners is currently ignored. Part IV will further bolster the theoretical argument by reviewing its implications for other
legal rules in the fields of property, nuisance, and intellectual property.
Finally, an important caveat should be kept in mind throughout
this Article. The community right suggested here is not absolute. I
am arguing that the community should be accorded partnership
status in private properties. But in our liberal society, the community
is solely the owner’s junior partner—and it must remain so. While
property has a community aspect that should provide security and
assure some degree of neighborhood stability, property is also a tool
to promote liberty. The community interest in ownership does not
imply an attempt to negate an owner’s ability to move out of her
home and community. As its name indicates, the community aspect
of ownership merely calls for the introduction of another aspect to
private ownership, not for the institution’s abolition.
II.

THE COMMUNITY ASPECT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND
PROPERTY THEORY
A. Communitarian Theories

In an influential study, sociologist Herbert Gans found that Levittown, New Jersey—the quintessential postwar American suburb—
was neither an economic unit whose members depended on each
other, nor a cohesive social body.26 In this respect it differed greatly
from earlier communities, such as the medieval town.27 Nevertheless,
Gans discovered that in Levittown, very much like in the medieval
town, there was the possibility of “an intense identification with the
community” if exposed to an external threat.28 Communitarian theo-

26. HERBERT J. GANS, THE LEVITTOWNERS: WAYS OF LIFE AND POLITICS IN A NEW
SUBURBAN COMMUNITY 145 (1967). The town has since reverted to its original name: Willingboro Township.
27. On the medieval town, see GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING
COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 27-30 (1999).
28. GANS, supra note 26, at 145.
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ries seize upon this persistent sociological, non-materialistic role of
communities in defining individuals.
Though pursued elsewhere for decades, these theories’ application
to property discourse is a recent phenomenon.29 Nonetheless, as they
make the most natural argument for recognizing community attributes
of private ownership, they should serve as the starting point for this
Article’s theoretical discussion. This Section will show how communitarianism recognizes the community element inherent to ownership
and advocates for an ensuing need to maintain stable neighborhoods.
1. The Communitarian Worldview
Communitarian thought evolved in reaction to the liberal tradition, 30 and many of its proponents trace its roots to the Aristotelian
idea of the “good life.”31 Communitarians reject the liberal notion that
the “right” is prior to the “good.” They believe that “principles of justice depend for their justification on the moral worth . . . of the ends
they serve,”32 i.e., on a particular conception of the good life.33 This
position stands in stark contrast to the liberal aspiration at neutrality, epitomized in the positioning of individual liberty as the substitute for any predetermined set of values describing the good life. This
liberal celebration of individual liberty is grounded in a conception of
the individual that is rejected by communitarians.
The liberal individual is depicted by communitarians as an empty,
atomized, disembodied, solitary, characterless self. The liberal self
exists before her attributes, associations, and ends, which she only

29. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community,
10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127 (2009); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91
VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005). In addition, Gerald Frug applied communitarian theories to local
government law, FRUG, supra note 27, at 85-89, and Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of
Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1989)
to homeowners associations. The value of groups has also been used to justify the constitutional protection of group rights. See Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The
Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983).
30. Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6,
20 (1990).
31. Aristotle believed that humans are not born with the capacity to live full human
lives. Such lives require the cultivation of intellectual and moral virtues that can only take
place when an individual forms a part of a political community. Humans can perform their
highest actions, such as philosophy or virtuous acts, only within a community. Hence Aristotle described the relationship between the individual and the community as a part-whole
relationship. Many, though not all, philosophers further argue that for Aristotle the community was a natural, or organic, entity. Compare David Keyt, Three Fundamental Theorems in Aristotle’s Politics, 32 PHRONESIS 54 (1987), with Robert Mayhew, Part and Whole
in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy, 1 J. ETHICS 325 (1997).
32. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE xi (2d ed. 1998).
33. Id. at 185-86.
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later chooses in an independent manner.34 The resulting liberal society is constituted by many different selves, each with different ends.
Values become nothing but the distinct expressions of preferences of
the separate selves. In such a society there can be no aspiration towards reaching an agreement regarding values or the nature of the
good life, and hence each individual must be left free to set her own
perceptions of the good life.35
Against this detached liberal self, communitarians posit their alternative: a social self, deeply attached to her community. She is a
situated self—born and placed into certain associations. The attachments to these associations define her and mold her identity.36 Without them, the self is not only devoid of character,37 but also of the
ability to feel, since feelings are learned through the experience of
others and cannot be described even to oneself without sharing a tradition of discourse.38 As Charles Taylor explains, “[m]y identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the
frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to
case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I
endorse or oppose.”39 This is not to say that the self enjoys no independence; the self can decide at a certain point in her life to break
loose from her community and develop her unique identity and values. However, the uniqueness of her new values—indeed her independence itself—will be defined in relation to the social values she
previously absorbed.40
This portrayal of the self’s communal constitution is perceived as
the heart of communitarian thinking. Michael Walzer, however, argues that fellow communitarians carry the point too far. He believes
that the central issue is not the self’s constitution, but rather the pattern of social relations.41 Liberalism is a theory of relationship that
has voluntary associations at its center, with voluntarism meaning a
persistent right of rupture.42 Communitarians view these ties not as

34. Id. at 62-65, 94-95, 133, 186-88; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN
MORAL THEORY 33 (2d ed. 1984); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN IDENTITY 35 (1989).
35. See SANDEL, supra note 32, at 175-77; TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 507 (arguing
further that since under such an outlook nothing outside subjective goals can be allowed to
trump self-realization, the resulting modes of life are shallow).
36. See SANDEL, supra note 32, at 150; MACINTYRE, supra note 34, at 33-34; see also
Duncan Kennedy, Political Power and Cultural Subordination: A Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, in AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE 83, 90 (Dan
Danielson & Karen Engle eds., 1995).
37. SANDEL, supra note 32, at 179.
38. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 20-21 (1984).
39. TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 27.
40. Id. at 36, 39.
41. Walzer, supra note 30, at 21.
42. Id. at 20-21.
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associations but as attachments, which the individual does not
choose and which she is limited in her ability to sever.
The contrast between liberalism and communitarianism concerning the nature of relationships is not merely theoretical. It has an
empirical component. In this regard communitarianism is of a dualistic quality. On the one hand it is a normative attack on a modern society that has allegedly become liberal, lacking consensus and guided
by private caprices. On the other hand, it is a sociological-empirical
condemnation of modern liberal thinking for misrepresenting real life,
in which social ties still matter. The normative and empirical arguments cannot coexist: each implies an opposite diagnosis of modern
society. Walzer settles the inconsistency by concluding that each of
the two claims is only partly right.43 Modern society is indeed characterized by a continuous motion of individuals, who leave behind,
more easily than before, old associations and attachments. But individuals have remained to some degree creatures of community,
whose ties of place, class, family, and politics survive new mobility.44
As the culmination of this—partly normative, partly sociological—
criticism of liberalism, communitarians prescribe a clear policy.
Alasdair MacIntyre, who laments the loss of morality reaching its
climax with modern liberalism, concludes with these powerful words:
What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of
community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life
can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon
us. And if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors
of the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope.
This time however the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite some time.45

MacIntyre and others view the reinstitution and reinforcement of
communities as a moral concern. But it is not only a moral imperative. It is also a political concern for the democratic state. Unlike
Enlightenment European republicans who viewed intermediate
communities as a threat to general society,46 communitarians regard
these “partial societies” as vital for the survival of the state. The
shattering of local communities will lead to the disintegration of the
larger national community since a “society of self-fulfillers,” where
43. Id. at 20-22.
44. Id. at 7-14.
45. MACINTYRE, supra note 34, at 263.
46. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 17-18 (G. Cole trans., 2003).
Some argue that Rousseau’s objection to intermediate associations was more attenuated.
See Maure L. Goldschmidt, Rousseau on Intermediate Associations, in VOLUNTARY
ASSOCIATIONS: NOMOS XI 119 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1969). Regardless, American civic republicans have traditionally been much more sympathetic to
intermediate communal entities. See generally Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE
L.J. 1493 (1988).
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affiliations are perceived as revocable, cannot sustain the strong
identification with the political community democracy requires.47 For
this reason, in the words of John Dewey:
When a state is a good state . . . . [i]t renders the desirable associations solider and more coherent . . . . it gives the individual members of valued associations greater liberty and security: it relieves
them of hampering conditions which if they had to cope with personally would absorb their energies in mere negative struggle
against evils. It enables individual members to count with reasonable certainty upon what others will do, and thus facilitates mutually helpful coöperations [sic].48

In so acting to preserve a community, the state unavoidably inflicts harms on some members of that community—it curtails their
freedom in order to serve their community’s interests. As seen in the
Introduction, the community interest is not only a right, but also a
duty placed on community members. Under communitarian premises
this harm is justified, even from the standpoint of the injured party.
When required to enlist her resources in the service of a communal
endeavor, the communitarian individual is not being used for others’
ends; she is contributing to the purposes of a community she regards,
or regarded in the recent past, as her own. The justification for her
sacrifice “is not the abstract assurance that unknown others will gain
more than [she] will lose, but the rather more compelling notion that
by [her loss she] contribute[s] to the realization of a way of life in
which she take[s] pride and with which [her] identity is bound.”49
So far we have seen why community matters, why the state must
act in order to help it survive, and why, when doing so, the state may
demand contributions from community members. This is not enough
for the purposes of this Article’s argument. For communitarianism to
serve as grounds for recognizing a community aspect inherent to private property and necessitating legal action to stabilize surroundings,
it must be shown that the neighborhood—private land’s environment—is a community. For communitarians a community is not a
spatial notion. A community is created by “a common vocabulary of
discourse and a background of implicit practices and understandings
within which the opacity of the participants is reduced if never finally dissolved.”50

47. TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 508.
48. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 71-72 (Swallow Press 1991) (1927).
49. SANDEL, supra note 32, at 143. Not surprisingly, critics of communitarianism find
such “ethics of sacrifice” worrisome. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Reimagining Takings Law,
in P ROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 39, 44 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver
eds., 2010).
50. Id. at 172.
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Localities are frequently invoked in communitarian writings as
examples of such communities,51 and it is widely believed that social
groups are often constituted by their connection to land.52 As Jennifer
Wolch and Michael Dear wrote, “social life structures territory . . .
and territory shapes social life.”53 These claims are bolstered by the
works of urban scientists who have found that neighborhoods provide
residents with an important source of identity. Over the past halfcentury the traditional notion of the neighborhood as an organic selfcontained unit has receded.54 Nonetheless, planners and social scientists still consider the neighborhood to be a meaningful unit. While
they accept that the neighborhood is a contested concept lacking a
settled definition, 55 most contend that this indeterminacy does not
disprove the neighborhood’s existence.56 Even the currently prevalent
open-ended definitions—such as that “a neighborhood is a limited
territory within a larger urban area where people inhabit dwellings
and interact socially”57—posit that neighborhoods offer not only spatial demarcations but also social demarcations. Therefore it is not
surprising that studies have found that residents will act passionately relying on the meaning the neighborhood provides them.58
Communitarians will agree that the individual and her private
abode are meaningless when separated from their surrounding community. Part of what makes an individual an individual, and a home
a home, is their close environment. Identity is intimately tied to
memory and a person’s memory is interconnected with the histories
of her neighbors.59 Therefore,
a more humane conception of land has to go beyond the notion of a
physical, material space demarcated by a finite number of square
feet. It also must be understood as an integral part of the social

51. See, e.g., id. at 143.
52. Alexander, supra note 29, at 11-12.
53. THE POWER OF GEOGRAPHY: HOW TERRITORY SHAPES SOCIAL LIFE 4 (Jennifer
Wolch & Michael J. Dear eds., 1989).
54. See, e.g., GERALD D. SUTTLES, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITIES (1972);
HERBERT J. GANS, PEOPLE, PLANS, AND POLICIES: ESSAYS ON POVERTY, RACISM, AND OTHER
NATIONAL URBAN PROBLEMS (1991).
55. ROBERT K. YIN, CONSERVING AMERICA’S NEIGHBORHOODS 121 (1982); NAT’L
COMM’N ON NEIGHBORHOODS, PEOPLE, BUILDING NEIGHBORHOODS: FINAL REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (1979).
56. HOWARD W. HALLMAN, NEIGHBORHOODS: THEIR PLACE IN URBAN LIFE 15 (1984).
57. Id. at 13. For a similar definition, see ANTHONY DOWNS, NEIGHBORHOODS AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 15 (1981).
58. JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PLACE 101-02, 107-08 (1987).
59. DOLORES HAYDEN, THE POWER OF PLACE: URBAN LANDSCAPES AS PUBLIC HISTORY
9 (1997).
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and spiritual life of our communities—socially produced places
that have meaning for all of us.60

Communitarians will argue that measures should be adopted so that
the neighborhood, given its importance as a community, can persist. In
a similar vein, a communitarian will object to the perception of the
neighborhood as a mere commodity, whose fate is to be determined by
market dynamics generated by the actions of supposedly despotic
owners. The mere use of price rhetoric in this context can be accused of
engendering social alienation, of undermining personal identity, and of
doing “violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human.”61
2. Complicating to the Communitarian Worldview
While the communitarian endorsement of neighborhoods as communities that property law should embrace is straightforward, it often seems too simplistic. It should be fine-tuned. I will now examine
several critiques of communitarianism and use their counterarguments to question and revise several of the broad statements
made above.
A forceful denial of many communitarian assumptions is found in
post-modernist theory. Post modernists, occupied with the deconstruction of identity, view the self as fragmented and shifting.62 This
post-modern self is embedded within a matrix of social and psychological factors.63 The effort at prescribing one identity to the self is
not merely fruitless—it is dangerous; all the interlacing identities
within the self are delusional and serve as tools for exercising power
over her, by defining the “self” and contrasting her with the “other.”
The self’s identity and relationships, complex and highly mobile, are
performances. They are not an “internal” feature of hers, but an effort she makes to live up to an invented figure others created for her.
The choice of words here is important: the self is invented, but is by
no means false, as there is no “true inner self” to be repressed.64
These few lines cannot begin to convey the richness and complexity of post-modernist literature, but they introduce the essence of the
post-modernist reply to this Section’s themes. They suggest that the
neighborhood should not be treated as the self’s main source of iden60. TOM ANGOTTI, NEW YORK FOR SALE: COMMUNITY PLANNING CONFRONTS GLOBAL
REAL ESTATE 22 (2008).
61. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1905-06
(1987); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 164-66 (1993).
62. Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path
Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 307-08 (1991).
63. Id. at 307.
64. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY xiv-xv, 181-90 (1999); FRUG, supra note 27, at 92-97; JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD,
THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 14-17 (1984); ROBIN WEST,
CARING FOR JUSTICE 281-84 (1997); Williams, supra note 62, at 306-08.
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tity; that we should be sensitive to the discourse of power associated
with spatial identities and with any community component inserted
into private rights. The basic demand post-modernism makes is to
realize that the community and the connections that allegedly tie individual residents to it are performances. But what are the implications of these observations?
Mostly they advise us to exercise caution in arguing for the social
component of the self generally and for neighborhood stability particularly. Caution here does not necessarily entail a substantial revision of the communitarian project. Caution implies acknowledging
that each individual has many identities, and that the neighborhood—or any other community—may be the mainstream’s weapon
for subjugating minorities. Despite this cautionary note, the postmodernist perspective does not deny the need for personal and community identity. Post-modernism does not require law to ignore the
enabling and constitutive power that identities and communities exert over people’s lives and feelings. They might be performances,
mythical rather than real connections, but they still influence people
and hence deserve recognition.
The neighborhood is an “imagined community,” 65 often defined
less by actual interactions and “true” identity than by subjective perceptions and beliefs regarding the existence and importance of said
interactions and identity.66 This does not mean that the neighborhood
is a mere personal fantasy that can persist indefinitely regardless of
changes to surrounding places and people. 67 Rather it is an intersubjective creation. Being a “neighbor” might be a performance, but
one that needs to be performed with, and in front of, others who are
engaged in the same performance and understand it. The fleeting
and seemingly meaningless sight of a neighbor, the knowledge that
she is there, constructs the neighborhood and confers psychic benefits.
The neighborhood might be imagined, but it is still important for individuals and thus should carry legal weight.

65. The term “imagined community” was coined by Benedict Anderson to describe the
notion of the nation. Anderson explained that the nation is imagined since its members
view themselves as related to one another, despite the fact that they have never met all
their “fellow” nationals. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON
THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 5-6 (rev. ed. 1991).
66. Residents sometimes even have difficulty describing the boundaries of their
neighborhoods. See generally ALBERT HUNTER, SYMBOLIC COMMUNITIES (1974). They will
talk about “their neighborhood” or “their community,” even though the boundaries and
meanings of these self-defined places are unlikely to be exact. WILLIAM PETERMAN,
NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING AND COMMUNITY-BASED DEVELOPMENT: THE POTENTIAL AND
LIMITS OF GRASSROOTS ACTION 21 (2000).
67. See ANGOTTI, supra note 60, at 22 (“[S]tories of people threatened with displacement
show how land may evoke deep feelings and emotions associated with the everyday lives
and activities of people. This approach cannot be understood as purely ‘subjective’ because
ideologies and symbols have a material base and are a material force in the world.”).
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This revised understanding of the nature of community can be
used as a reply to a critique of the communitarian case coming from
another quarter. Some argue that it is a mistake to group all
neighborhoods under the same heading. They concede that some
neighborhoods are communities and should be protected, but they
contend that other neighborhoods are not communities. These views
are associated with an understanding of community as implying real
life interactions. When faced with a neighborhood where one resident
has never talked to another, adherents to this understanding deny
the neighborhood’s pretensions of community status.68 This “behavioralist” approach would therefore require, before a specific locale is
granted protection, an empirical examination to determine to what
degree its residents interact.69
But the portrayal of the neighborhood as an imagined community
renders unsustainable such cries for empirical distinctions. The experience of community is richer than that represented by any metric
of interactions suggested by a behavioralist approach. As we saw, the
neighborhood defies easy objective definitions. 70 The community is
based on imagination and beliefs, and thus there is no need for it to
always have actual, objective, or easily identifiable features. “A
neighborhood is a subjective entity as well as an objective reality. Its
face and form and the social relations within are what individual
residents perceive.”71 The neighborhood as residents imagine it, an
abstract invented idea, may be more important than the neighborhood residents actually experience. Even when its beneficial attributes are a shared fantasy, the neighborhood still delivers those beneficial attributes. Without them, the individual loses something that is
important to her constitution, and her private property ceases to perform a function that is extremely important.
3. The Communitarian Worldview in Property Law
Communitarian theories are invoked much less often than theories presented in the following Sections when property law rules are
debated. Still, their neglect does not render them irrelevant; they are
not alien to existing property rules.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of maintaining
communities, noting that “the State has a legitimate interest in local
68. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 87-89 (1993).
69. An example for this research approach is social networks analysis. See, e.g., Gary
Bridge, Gentrification, Class and Community: A Social Network Approach, in THE URBAN
CONTEXT: ETHNICITY, SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS 259 (Alisdair Rogers
& Steven Vertovec eds., 1995).
70. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
71. HALLMAN, supra note 56, at 13. See also NAT’L COMM’N ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra
note 55, at 7 (admiting an inability to provide an agreed definition of “neighborhood,” and
concluding that “[i]n the last analysis, each neighborhood is what the inhabitants think it is”).
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neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability.” 72 It thus upheld a property tax scheme that discriminated against similarly located properties in the service of neighborhood preservation.73 Elsewhere, citing the same public interest in preserving neighborhood
character, the Court authorized the curtailment of owners’ free
speech in an effort to disperse adult motion picture theatres throughout the city.74 Other courts have addressed governmentally inflicted
harms to neighborhoods’ stability in similar communitarian terms.
When New York City approved the construction of a luxury building
in Chinatown, the state Court of Appeals ruled that under the State
Environmental Quality Review Act,75 the city should have considered
detrimental effects on the Chinatown community. The court construed the phrase “environmental impact” as including impact upon
“neighborhood character.”76
Furthermore, communitarian thinking exerts tremendous influence throughout whole bodies of property law. Zoning laws, often
presented as tools for spatial engineering, function to a great extent
as measures of social engineering. They are employed to control the
community, not just the environment. 77 Restricting construction to
single-family units, mandating minimum lot sizes, limiting the ability to subdivide, capping the number of unrelated occupants—these
laws serve to keep unwanted persons out of the community.78 Exclusionary zoning is many times attributed to municipalities’ desire in
ensuring a tax base,79 but some argue that it is mainly driven by nonfiscal reasons, such as preferences for racial and income homogeneity
and preservation of suburban lifestyles. 80 These non-fiscal reasons
can be understood, at least to some extent, as communitarian.
Zoning laws are no longer the only instrument designing the environments and communities within which owners exercise their rights.

72. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992).
73. Id.
74. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
75. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8 (Consol. 2011).
76. Chinese Staff & Workers Ass'n v. City of New York, 502 N.E.2d 176, 180 (N.Y. 1986).
The federal statute, the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4321, has not been
interpreted in this manner. See Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1976).
77. See, e.g., J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J.
761, 762-67, 777-78, 806-07 (1982).
78. LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 58, at 186.
79. See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 730-31
(N.J. 1975). The seminal paper on fiscal zoning is Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property
Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205 (1975) (explaining that by
setting a minimum value for properties in the locality, zoning assures that buyers will pay
a minimum share of property taxes). There are other economic motives for exclusionary
land use control, as explained in Lee Anne Fennell, Exclusion’s Attraction: Land Use Controls in Tieboutian Perspective, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC
ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 163, 173-77 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006).
80. DUANE WINDSOR, FISCAL ZONING IN SUBURBAN COMMUNITIES 38-39, 41-42 (1979).
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As many as sixty million Americans are now living in housing subject
to covenants limiting the uses of their properties and governed by a
condominium or homeowners association. 81 Traditionally, property
law placed many restrictions on the ability to create and enforce
covenants, as they curtail the owner’s freedom to use her land. The
legal drive to liberalize these old laws of restrictive covenants culminated in the adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Prop. (Servitudes)
in the year 2000. It has facilitated the placement of intrusive restrictions on the rights of owners. 82 These can, for example, forbid repainting,83 constructing or dismantling a fence,84 hanging curtains,85
planting trees,86 or keeping pets.87 They might also limit an owner’s
freedom to lease or sell her property. 88 Such restrictions do not
merely safeguard certain desired neighborhood aesthetics; they also
ensure that the residents themselves correspond to a certain “community character.”89 Affirmative covenants, such as a duty to pay fees
for membership in a recreational club,90 serve a similar function.
Covenants are regarded by many as forms of private governance,
assuming roles once ascribed to public government.91 Yet individualistic-utilitarian explanations cannot alone account for homeowners
associations’ popularity. Covenants have generally not been carefully
designed to assure maximization of property values. For example,
81. According to estimates, as of 2010, 62 million Americans were living in homeowners associations, condominiums, or cooperatives. An estimated 309,600 such planned communities existed, containing 24.8 housing units overall. Cmty. Ass’ns Inst., Industry Data:
National Statistics, http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Sept. 2, 2011).
82. For more on restrictive covenants and homeowners associations, see, for example,
EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1994) and James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory
Servitudes: Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity,
1989 WIS. L. REV. 1, 88 (1989).
83. See, e.g., W. Hill Colony, Inc. v. Sauerwein, 138 N.E.2d 403 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
84. See, e.g., Cohen v. Kite Hill Cmty. Ass’n, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
85. See Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553, 556 (2002).
86. See, e.g., Ironwood Owners Ass’n IX v. Solomon, 224 Cal. Rptr. 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
87. See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 63 (Cal. 1994).
But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1360.5 (West 2007) (adopted following the decision, and making it
illegal for an association to prohibit owners from keeping at least one pet).
88. See, e.g., Laguna Royale Owners Ass’n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136, 141 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981) (holding that a restriction on the right of alienation requiring that the condominium board consent to a sale will be upheld if exercised reasonably); Franklin v. Spadafora, 447 N.E.2d 1244, 1250 (Mass. 1983) (upholding covenant limiting the number of units
a person can own in a condominium, thereby barring one resident from selling to another);
Worthinglen Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. Brown, 566 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989) (holding that condominium declaration prohibited leases).
89. Racially restrictive covenants, though, are now forbidden. See Fair Housing Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2006); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 120 (1948).
90. See, e.g., Regency Homes Ass’n v. Egermayer, 498 N.W.2d 783, 793 (Neb. 1993).
91. See Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1976).
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they do not allow for deviation from association rules whenever an
expert panel predicts that an owner’s proposed action will increase
property values.92 The reason is that covenants are not only meant to
keep property values from declining; they are meant to preserve
community character, even when threatened by actions that increase
property values.
In light of this role of homeowners associations, the legal regime that
allowed them to prosper can be viewed as corresponding to communitarian views.93 The willingness of property law in this and the other
contexts presented in this Subsection to further communitarian
causes illustrates how communitarian ideas can be employed to legitimize the recognition of the community interest in property. It shows
that doing so will not be out of line with existing property principles.
If anything, it will complement them. Law has on many occasions
restricted its recognition of the community interest to affluent communities. While exclusionary zoning and homeowners association
laws serve communitarian goals in private properties situated in
relatively affluent neighborhoods, political authorities and courts
have been much less eager to adopt similar community-promoting
property rules when inner city properties are concerned.94 This discrimination against the community needs of lower income residents
is troubling, since the local community and the social ties it engenders play a larger role in the lives of the poor than in the lives of the
affluent.95 The latter, given their resources and salience, may much
more easily find and, if necessary, create other communities within
which they feel at home and freely express their identities.96
4. Conclusion
Communitarian theories insist that the individual cannot exist
without the community, and thus she cannot be served by private
rights, such as ownership, that lack a community component. They
advocate for the protection of neighborhood stability, and property
law indeed recognizes this need in many fields. Yet as persuasive as
the communitarian case may be, the protection of neighborhood stability must not be absolute. An extreme communitarian conception
will lead to effacement of the individual and erosion of freedom.97
92. Homeowners associations’ staunch supporters have recognized the need for allowing covenants’ modification without a unanimous vote, as is customary. See Richard A.
Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 922 (1988).
93. See Alexander, supra note 29, at 11-12, 40-42.
94. See FRUG, supra note 27, at 81-82.
95. Jeffery James Minton, Rent Control: Can and Should It Be Used to Combat Gentrification? 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 823, 827, 833 (1997).
96. For a similar argument, see RADIN, supra note 68, at 70, 97.
97. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE 147-50, 231-32 (1984); Dagan, supra note 49, at 44.
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Furthermore, community members are not the only ones to pay the
price of the community’s empowerment. Outsiders, the “others” used
to define the community members’ “we,” pay a higher toll.98 As put by
Gregory Alexander, “[c]ommunities by their very nature exclude.”99
Rigid adherence to the ideal of stable neighborhoods is extremely
dangerous. It will block residents from moving out, impeding their
pursuit of lives they desire. It will prevent others, immigrants who
could have improved their own living standards and enriched the
neighborhood, from moving in.100 We must not blind ourselves to the
costs of zealously promoting community stability. This is a key theme
of this Article—stability and change must be allowed to interplay. We
need and want stability to exist side by side with change, not at its
expense. Most communitarians will agree with this contention;101 it is
not clear, however, whether communitarianism can offer a sensible
balance. Communitarians should not ignore the role of the individual
and mobility, just as liberals should not ignore the role of the community and stability.
B. Utilitarian Theories
In the preceding Section the justification for recognizing the community’s stake in a private owner’s right and the ensuing legal need
to promote neighborhood stability was derived from the community’s
alleged intrinsic value. That is, the community was perceived as a
good in itself. Utilitarian theories vehemently reject any such notion.
The only goods they recognize are those originating in the individual
and her preferences. The community as such is of no value.102 But
what if individuals, independently, want a community? This Section
will put forward possible utilitarian responses to this challenge, developing a utilitarian case for the community aspect of ownership.
1. Preferences for a Stable Community
Welfare economics, probably the currently most prevalent utilitarian theory, assesses policies exclusively in terms of their effects on
individuals’ wellbeing. 103 The notion of wellbeing—“utility”—
incorporates everything that an individual might value.104 The analy-

98. See William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 14031412 (1991).
99. Alexander, supra note 29, at 52.
100. See Robert C. Ellickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
947, 953 (1991).
101. See, e.g., Walzer, supra note 30, at 21-22.
102. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 12 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Oxford University Press 1996) (1781).
103. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 16 (2002).
104. Id. at 18.
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sis revolves around the actual preferences of individuals, not on what
the analyst thinks these preferences ought to be.105
Hence, for welfare economics to support legal promotion of community stability, it must be shown that stability corresponds to individuals’ actual preferences. Some evidence for the existence of such a
preference was provided earlier when the popularity of homeowners
associations was noted. Americans are eager to be able to exercise
control not only upon the physical contours of their homes, but also
upon the surroundings’ human composition. Their motivation might
be assuring quality of living, and it might also be that such control
preserves property values: in either case the premiums owners put on
exerting this power indicate a potent preference for avoiding change.
A strong consumer preference for living in homogenous neighborhoods exists.106 Housing in such neighborhoods commands a substantial “exclusivity premium.”107 Anxiety and social fright are widely associated with anticipated neighborhood change. 108 The American
suburban dream has been based on the constant fear of being caught
up by people of lower standing, of neighborhoods being “invaded.”
More recently, as the Introduction demonstrated, inner city homeowners have turned apprehensive as higher-class residents invade
their neighborhoods. All these observations indicate an intense preference for neighborhood stability.
This preference is readily explicable. The neighborhood is the focal
point of residents’ daily routine. Since routines only develop after a
lengthy process of trial and error, neighborhood change undermining
a routine’s element is costly. Neighborhoods also supply residents
with informal support networks, which deliver various goods, ranging
from a cup of sugar and babysitting to political connections. These
bonds enable people to rely on one another.109 The bonds of trust also
allow residents to learn what to expect from each other. Residents
can then cooperate in order to achieve common goals, such as better
local services.110 Neighborhood bonds facilitate the creation of social
norms and other coping mechanisms that invisibly control behavior
and prevent unacceptable actions, like parking across another’s
driveway or playing loud music at night. These civil forces control
uncivil actions, and only in exceptional cases is police intervention
105. See id. at 409-463.
106. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV.
1167, 1199-1201 (1981).
107. Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: The Economics of Inclusionary
Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23, 55-59 (1996).
108. CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN
AMERICA 109 (1977).
109. See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 58, at 103-05.
110. Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation in the Production of
Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 71 (2001).
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needed. These norms and their informal enforcement render residents’
lives more agreeable. When neighborhood stability is lost, social
norms break down.111 In addition, a stable neighborhood provides a
sense of physical and psychic security that comes with a familiar and
dependable environment. Being a part of a stable community provides
the benefit of membership in an orderly and protective social space.
Finally, a neighborhood enables residents to benefit from economies
of scale; residents enjoy benefits that would have been unavailable
had they not been living within the community. The concentration of
a large number of similar people stimulates the development of agglomerations appropriate to their needs. For example, in an immigrants’ community residents will enjoy restaurants, shops, and entertainment venues tailored to their customs. If the community disintegrates and its members disperse, such businesses will not be operated and the individuals will be deprived of goods they desire.112
The conclusion is that individuals entertain a preference for stable
communities, as these enhance their welfare. Obviously, this preference is different from a preference for, say, running water or heating.
Unlike running water or heating, a stable community is an intangible good. The quantification of such a good is always difficult. It is
rendered even more difficult in this case since a stable community
entertains characteristics of an irreplaceable good. Owners prize
their community because it is unique, and hence its valuation increases dramatically when the individual owns a right in it. Therefore, the discrepancy between relevant asking and offering prices is
likely to be substantial,113 and the allocation of a property right in the
community’s preservation will greatly influence its valuation.
These characteristics make it challenging for economic analysis to
calculate the preference, since the analysis tends to focus on preferences’ monetary values. Indeed, efficiency analysis has been criticized for not accounting for the loss of a community’s way of life as a
cost.114 Yet the difficulty associated with appraising such intangible
preferences, accompanied by lack of rigor on the part of some analysts, is no valid justification for welfare economics to ignore a viable
preference.115 Welfare economics, as explained above, is interested in
all actual preferences regardless of their nature.

111. ROLF GOETZE, UNDERSTANDING NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: THE ROLE OF
EXPECTATIONS IN URBAN REVITALIZATION 92 (1979).
112. See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 58, at 105-09.
113. On these problems of valuating irreplaceable goods, see Daniel S. Levy & David
Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic
Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 506-15 (1994).
114. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 124-125; Radin, supra note 61, at 1878.
115. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 124-125; Radin, supra note 61, at 1878; KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, supra note 103, at 454-55.
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2. Providing for a Stable Community: Markets and Dilemmas
After a preference for a good has been identified, welfare economic
analysis inquires whether legal intervention in the allocation of
rights is necessary to assure the supply of desired quantities of the
good. I intend to prove that such a need exists since problems of collective action inhibit the market from providing desired levels of
community stability.
a. Stable Communities as a Public Good
A stable community is in many ways a public good, yet it is not a
classic or pure public good. Public goods are defined by two attributes:
non-rivalry of consumption and non-excludability of benefits.116 Application of these criteria to neighborhood stability produces ambiguous results. As to non-rivalry of consumption, a resident’s partaking
in the consumption of neighborhood stability’s benefits does not reduce the benefits derived by others. On the other hand, each outsider
added to the pool of consumers of neighborhood stability—each new
resident—is likely to subtract from the enjoyment of stability by
other neighbors: newcomers, by their very nature, contradict stability.
In this regard neighborhood stability corresponds to the definition of
a “club good,” which involves only a certain degree of “publicness” in
consumption. It is a good optimally consumed by more than one person but less than an infinitely large number of persons. Beyond a certain group size, the benefit that the individual places on the good will
decline as congestion sets in.117
The non-excludability criterion also indicates that we are faced
with a case of a partially public good: insiders cannot be excluded
from enjoying the benefits derived from a stable community, while
outsiders can be excluded. The latter can be blocked via zoning or
covenants from moving into the neighborhood and enjoying the community’s stability. Still, not all benefits generated by a stable community can be withheld from outsiders. A community’s stability may
confer benefits on the entire society. Displacement, gentrification,
and neighborhood abandonment have negative social and economic
effects—externalities—burdening the entire society. These include
extreme poverty, social unrest, homelessness, crime, and arson.118 To
116. RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 8-9 (2d ed. 1996); see also RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B.
MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 44 (Scott D. Stratford ed., 5th ed.
1989) (noting that “[a]lthough the features of nonrival consumption and nonexcludability
need not go together, they frequently do”).
117. James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965).
118. See James Brady, The Social Economy of Arson: Vandals, Gangsters, Bankers and
Officials in the Making of an Urban Problem, in 6 RESEARCH IN LAW, DEVIANCE AND SOCIAL
CONTROL: A RESEARCH ANNUAL 199, 212 (Steven Spitzer & Andrew T. Scull eds., 1984).
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the extent that neighborhood stability prevents such phenomena, its
benefits are non-excludable.
b. The Failure of Market Mechanisms in Policing the Provision of
Community Stability
That neighborhood stability is not endowed with all the characteristics of a public good does not necessarily render it a regular consumer good. No good fits fully the polar definition of a public good.119
Moreover, the major market mechanism regulating the provision of
private goods is highly problematic when used for the efficient provision of neighborhood stability. The “exit” mechanism represents the
ability to stop consuming a certain producer’s products. It is vital to
the functioning of an efficient market, as it communicates consumers’
desires to producers and forces them to adjust. Goods provided by
local government have triggered debate regarding their dual nature
as public and consumer goods, mainly due to the controversial role of
this “exit” mechanism in local life.
In a highly influential article, Charles Tiebout sought to show that
local services are very much like ordinary private goods. 120 In his
model, the nation is perceived as a market, where each municipality
supplies public goods—such as education, sanitation, and security—
at a price—represented by taxation—and consumers choose freely the
municipality that satisfies best their set of preferences. Citizens pick
a locality in the same manner as they choose any other product: Tiebout
compares the citizen’s search for a community to a “shopping trip.”121
The model’s basic premise is that if the city does not provide the services desired by an individual she can move to another provider—she
can exercise the “exit” mechanism. This ability to leave a municipality
spurs competition over consumers, assuring municipalities’ efficiency.122
The model’s assumptions—e.g., that people are fully mobile and
have perfect knowledge regarding the quality of municipal services—
have been denounced as unrealistic.123 More important for this Article’s purposes, the mere exercise of the action of leaving a community—i.e., the operation of the “exit” mechanism—dramatically decreases social welfare. Normally, when a consumer chooses to avoid
119. 5 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 48-50 (1999).
120. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956).
121. Id. at 422.
122. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21 (1970).
123. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 26-27 (1998); Clayton
P. Gillette, The Wrong Side of the Tracks: A Revolutionary Rediscovery of the Common Law
Tradition of Fairness in the Struggle Against Inequality, 100 HARV. L. REV. 946, 959-60
(1987) (book review). Tiebout himself admitted that these two assumptions are problematic.
See Tiebout, supra note 120, at 423.
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consuming a product, her choice does not directly and immediately
affect her peers’ ability to remain loyal to that product and reap
the benefits they detect in it. This, however, is not the case with
the choice of a municipality. “Everybody who selects a new environment affects the environments of those he leaves and those he moves
among.”124 A consumer’s decision to leave a municipality hampers
the ability of those left behind to enjoy local services, especially as
the first to exit a deteriorating community are the most qualityconscious members, those who could make the greatest contribution
to fighting deterioration.125
In the context of neighborhood stability the problem intensifies: a
member’s choice to resort to the “exit” mechanism not only hastens
the deterioration of the good’s supply to others, but it actually embodies the deterioration. Since stability—people not departing en
masse—is the product, its supply cannot systematically be improved
by residents’ departure.126 True, the “exit” mechanism is not wholly
counterproductive. Stability implies that the residents maintain a
certain character, not necessarily that they remain the same individuals. Some individual turnover may even be vital to the maintenance of the characteristic that makes some neighborhoods desirable.
For example, a neighborhood cherished by owners as a good environment for families can only persist if at least some of its residents
leave once they become empty nesters.127 At that time those owners
should choose a neighborhood which better fits their new preferences.
Similarly, an immigrants’ neighborhood cannot be maintained unless
the established and integrated younger generations depart and are
replaced by more recent immigrants. But even in such neighborhoods,
when those exercising the “exit” mechanism are the residents who
contribute to the neighborhood’s character (i.e. in the first case families with children and in the second case recently arrived immigrants), stability—the relevant good—is threatened.
Moreover, the “exit” mechanism not only impedes the ability of
those who remain to enjoy the good, it also fails to provide the consumer opting for exit greater benefits from the good. Exiting a community and entering a different one stands in opposition to the exiting individual’s own desire to enjoy a stable community, for mobility
contrasts stability. The definition of the relevant good—neighborhood
124. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 150 (1978).
125. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 122, at 45-47, 49-51.
126. See Fennell, supra note 110, at 28-30 (arguing that “exit” cannot serve as a viable
feedback mechanism for spurring improvement in local education and security services
because the consumers are the product: consumers of municipalities don’t choose a product,
but rather who to live with. Thus, when they choose to leave one pool of users, the remaining consumers cannot improve who they are).
127. This assumes, of course, that not all neighbors become empty nesters at the same
moment and accordingly adopt a new preference regarding the character of the neighborhood.
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stability—is limited membership turnover; that is to say, limited exits and entries. Hence offering “exit” as a mechanism to supply the
good is very often contradictory to the good’s nature.
The “exit” mechanism cannot be fully relied on to discipline the
community to better appease members’ tastes, which is its healthy
market effect elsewhere. “Exit,” however, is not the only market
mechanism regulating the provision of goods. The other mechanism
associated with consumer goods and often appealed to when local
government services are discussed is the mechanism of “voice.”128 As
first explained by Albert Hirschman, the customer’s option of “exit” is
sometimes complemented or even substituted by expressing dissatisfaction to the managing authority. 129 Thanks to the ability of consumers to voice their concerns, producers become advised of market
preferences and the market can operate more efficiently. Unfortunately, the ability to assure desired levels of neighborhood stability
as a consumer good via the mechanism of “voice” is limited. The notion of “voice” assumes a distinction between consumers and management. It presupposes a tiered system with one level of consumers
and another of decisionmakers charged with controlling the quality of
the good provided to costumers.130 With neighborhood stability as a
good, the role of such central decisionmakers is secondary. Each
member needs to influence not only government to act, but other
members to act—i.e., to stay (recall the Introduction). Obviously,
governmental policies may indirectly influence other members’ decisions, yet eventually each member makes her own decision. Hence
utilizing one’s “voice” to influence “management” can only help in
providing the good up to a certain point.
c. The Strategic Dilemma Neighbors Face
Market tools are inadequate for the supply of community stability.
The main reason is that many times the situation involves a strategic
dilemma. All neighbors may want a stable community, but in order to
attain and maintain it they must act in concert. At the same time,
each neighbor may have an incentive to bail out whenever market
conditions make selling her house appealing.131 The situation is likely
to be aggravated by a fear of change strengthening the tendency to
128. See LYNN A. BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AND MATERIALS 338 (3d ed. 2004) (and sources listed therein).
129. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 122, at 4; see also id. at 15-20, 30-43.
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130. Fennell, supra note 110, at 23-24.
131. See Thomas C. Schelling, A Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 157, 174 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972)
(discussing the case of the deteriorating community, in which the owner seeks to limit her
monetary exposure). Since an owner risks a capital loss, she attempts to get rid of her
house a little sooner than everyone else. This is a strong incentive leading to spirals of
neighborhood decline. See id.
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sell, thereby prompting change in a “feedback loop.”132 Housing markets are easily susceptible to such self-fulfilling prophecies, as owners are sensitive to perceived “changes in the wind” that may alter
neighborhood characteristics.133 Prominent commentators argue that
this dynamic—in which homeowners can sustain or improve the
neighborhood if they all stay and invest in their properties, but an
owner who stays and invests when others leave will lose most of her
home’s value—resembles the Prisoner’s Dilemma.134 As the ensuing
discussion will illustrate, this proposition is inaccurate and leads to
misguided policy suggestions. A more accurate characterization of
the situation will suggest recognizing the community interest in private ownership as the strategic dilemma’s solution.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a strategic game in which the preferences of the actors are ranked as follows: (1) I defect, other actor cooperates, (2) I cooperate, other actor cooperates, (3) I defect, other
actor defects, (4) I cooperate, other actor defects. Regardless of the
other actor’s decision, a rational actor will choose to defect. This option leaves her better off no matter what the other actor chooses to do:
at the most it allows her to free ride the efforts of the other actor (option (1)), and at the least it assures her that the other actor will not
free ride her efforts (option (3)). The result is that all actors defect
and the preference fulfilled is option (3), even though all actors would
have been better off with another outcome (i.e. the resultant option (3)
does not represent maximum social welfare).135 Thus in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma the best result is unattainable in the absence of intervention.
Yet the structure of the Prisoner’s Dilemma does not correspond to
neighborhood dynamics. Before laying out the perimeters of the more
representative dynamics, the assumptions guiding them should be
specified. Based on the discussion in Section II.B.1., I will assume
that a resident has an absolute preference to stay in her stable
neighborhood. I will relax this unrealistic assumption later. Deprived
of the possibility to enjoy a stable community, she will prefer to leave
and sell her house for the highest price. Monetary benefit, according
to these assumptions, is a motivation, but it is only secondary to stabil132. Cf. DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK
MANAGER 310-11 (2002) (discussing debates in the 1930s concerning the possibility that
“feedback loops” could arise as a result of deposit insurance and unemployment insurance).
133. C. Leven, J. Little & H. Nourse, Neighborhood Change: Lessons in the Dynamics of
Urban Decay, in HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 192, 196 (Roger
Montgomery & Daniel R. Mandelker eds., 2d ed. 1979); see also OSCAR NEWMAN,
COMMUNITY OF INTEREST 83 (1980).
134. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 119, at 13-15; Duncan Kennedy, Legal Economics of
U.S. Low Income Housing Markets in Light of “Informality” Analysis, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 71, 76 (2002).
135. See generally MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION
108-19 (Dover Publications rev. ed. 1997) (1970) (discussing the historical evolution of
game theory and its potential applications, including the Prisoner’s Dilemma); RUSSELL
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 22-30 (1982).
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ity. I will further assume, at this preliminary stage, that stability can
be preserved only if all actors cooperate and stay in the neighborhood.
Based on these assumptions, the proper ranking of the actors’
preferences is: (1) I cooperate, other actor cooperates, (2) I defect,
other actor cooperates, (3) I defect, other actor defects, (4) I cooperate,
other actor defects.136 I assumed that residents’ highest preference is
having their environment remain stable, which means that both they
and their neighbors remain. Unlike the situation in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, free riding is not available as an option here: in order to
enjoy neighborhood stability, one must cooperate. 137 Defection, by
definition, carries a price of losing the enjoyment the actor derives
from the stable community. Hence, unlike in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
it is not the most preferred option, and that is why I swapped the
rankings of preferences (1) and (2) of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.138 Once
no possibility of enjoying the stable community survives, the actor
would like, at least, to cut her financial losses (or make a gain) and
leave the community. Yet when she decides to leave, other actors’ decisions cease to influence her enjoyment of a stable community. They
do probably influence the financial reward she reaps when defecting:
if others sell as well, the price a buyer will pay her diminishes.
Therefore, option (2) in most cases will be preferable to option (3).139
The worst option, as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, is staying in the
neighborhood, investing in the property while the community disintegrates. In this scenario, the actor loses both the benefits of stability
and the financial benefits associated with a sale. Her investments in
136. A similar ranking of preferences has been suggested for the decision whether to
rehabilitate a house in a rundown neighborhood. See McKim N. Barnes, A Strategy for
Residential Rehabilitation, REAL EST. REV., Fall 1976, at 40, 41.
137. The provision of stable communities differs from other local public goods, such as
lighting and security, where free riding is possible. See Gillette, supra note 123, at 957.
138. This ordering is even clearer in a deteriorating neighborhood: an owner will prefer to
have stability reintroduced over selling her home at a loss. In this case (unlike the gentrifying
neighborhood) preferences for neighborhood stability and for financial benefits correspond.
139. I chose to restrict this statement to most cases and not all since there might be a
difference between a declining and improving neighborhood. The logic of positions preference (2) before preference (3) is obvious in a declining neighborhood: the demand for housing is limited to begin with and hence as supply grows, prices decrease. In gentrifying
neighborhoods the situation is more complex. On the one hand, the above analysis of supply and demand may apply: the demand for housing may not be strong enough to offset the
rise in supply. On the other hand, the demand for housing in such neighborhood may rise
dramatically only after a certain point is attained. Most wealthy incomers arrive only after
the neighborhood has been partially transformed by earlier movers. Therefore, owners of
assets in a gentrifying neighborhood can receive higher consideration for their homes if
they sell only after the turnover rate intensified (and major gentrification set in motion).
Theoretically, being the last to sell might be the most lucrative option (preferences (4) and
(2) change places). However, in many cases this is not a viable option, since rising living
expenses in the improved neighborhood may exact a high price from a resident choosing to
stay too long. Therefore in a gentrifying neighborhood there is no rule ordering options (2)
and (3) (and to a lesser degree option(4)), since they depend on the elasticity of the supply
and demand curves.
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the neighborhood, which may solely amount to the loss of opportunity
to sell earlier at a better price, are gone to waste. The actor cannot
retrieve them, while standing alone they do nothing to provide desired neighborhood stability.
Changing the ordering of preferences in this manner changes the
dynamics of neighbors’ interaction. The problem arising out of this
ranking of preferences is similar to the Assurance Problem, rather
than to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 140 The major characteristic of the
Assurance Problem is that if the actor expects the other to cooperate,
she will cooperate as well, thereby assuring an efficient result. 141
Contrast this outcome to the one envisioned in the Prisoner’s Dilemma: there, even when the actor expects her counterpart to cooperate, she will defect (since she can free ride), and an efficient result
is unachievable. Our case, on the other hand, is covered by reciprocity theory: the collective action problem can be solved, but because of
the assurance problem, we cannot predict that it will be solved.142 An
actor confronted with an Assurance Problem, unlike one confronted
with a Prisoner’s Dilemma, has no dominant strategy: her preferred
action is influenced by her expectations of the other’s actions.143
This difference is of dramatic importance for policy-making. While
the Prisoner’s Dilemma presents a problem of compulsory enforcement, the Assurance Problem does not. In an Assurance Problem,
assurances as to other actors’ behavior are sufficient to achieve an
efficient result, and outside enforcement is unnecessary.144 Assurance
is needed because in its absence an actor may not trust the others to
cooperate. The actor will choose not to cooperate since her contribution will only have a miniscule effect on the desired outcome of a stable community, while it may result in the worst outcome for her: investing in the neighborhood without reward.145 However, once assur140. The Assurance Problem was identified in Amartya K. Sen, Isolation, Assurance
and the Social Rate of Discount, 81 Q.J. ECON. 112 (1967). The lack of clarity regarding the
ordering of options (2) and (3) is not detrimental to the characterization as an Assurance
Problem. Some variants of the Problem reverse the ordering of options (2) and (3). See, e.g.,
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of
Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 392 n.40 (1998).
141. Sen, supra note 140, at 114.
142. For a discussion on reciprocity theory and the assurance problem, see Robert Sugden, Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions, 94 ECON. J.
772, 781 (1984).
143. The Assurance Problem is similar to the “Stag Hunt Game.” Hungry hunters have
two options: work together and hunt a stag, which will provide them with a good meal, or
individually chase rabbits, which will provide a poorer meal. If one hunter deserts the company
and chases rabbits, the stag escapes. The best option, hence, is cooperating, while the worst
is chasing the stag when all others deserted to chase rabbits (in which case the remaining
cooperator starves). The choice is based on expectations regarding the fellow hunters’ behavior. See EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 121-24 (1977).
144. Sen, supra note 140, at 114-15.
145. This motivation to defect in an Assurance Problem has been labeled “hopelessness.” Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 140, at 392-94.
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ance is provided, enforcement is not needed in the Assurance Problem, for the result in which both actors cooperate is an “equilibrium
point”—a point from which no actor would depart even after the
other actor’s choices are revealed—since it is the actor’s top individual preference.146 In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the result where all actors cooperate is not an equilibrium point: each actor will still have
an incentive to defect and move to the result which is better from her
standpoint. Therefore assurances as to the other’s behavior are insufficient in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.147
The assurance needed in an Assurance Problem, such as the one
here, might be supplied by contracts: parties can promise each other
that they will cooperate. This is the practice of residents in homeowners
associations. Often enough, as seen in Section II.A.3., properties within
such communities are subject to restraints on alienation. Rights accorded to the association to block a unit’s transfer guarantee that no
resident will be able to defect in a manner hurtful to the community.148
However, outside such associations, in large and already constructed
neighborhoods, the transaction costs of subjecting all developed properties to restraints on alienation impede contractual assurances.
In the absence of explicit contracts, an implicit contract might still
serve as assurance. Implicit contracts can take the form of norms
based on ideas of honor149 or loyalty to the community.150 The reputational injury associated with violating social norms may assure that
the actor internalizes harms her defection causes to the community.
Though such intangible factors probably are at play, they are not robust checks on defections from neighborhoods, as the empirical record shows. 151 The costs of being denounced as a deserter are not
likely to affect a community member contemplating a move, because
she will not be around to suffer the harsh reaction.
Seeing that the market cannot produce an efficient contractual
assurance that will allow an efficient outcome, the solution is regulatory intervention. Recall that in the Assurance Problem defecting is
not a dominant strategy. There is no natural and unavoidable tendency to defect. The actor’s choice between defection and cooperation
is motivated by three factors: the costs associated with not defecting
146. Once more, in a declining neighborhood the same result is achieved without such
assumption. See infra note 159.
147. See Sen, supra note 140, at 122.
148. Restraints on alienation held by homeowners associations, unlike those held by
parties in other contexts, are generally upheld by courts if they either require the association to act reasonably or are in the form of preemptive rights. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 526 (3d ed. 2002).
149. ULLMAN-MARGALIT, supra note 143, at 36-37, 40-41.
150. For a discussion of the role of loyalty in economic and political markets, see
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 122, at 76-105.
151. Fennell, supra note 110, at 51.
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when others defect, the rewards offered by defecting, and the expectations regarding others’ behavior. One regulatory tool for adjusting
the payoffs—the first two factors affecting an actor’s decision—is a
partial locking device. This locking device ought to make the resident
contemplating leaving internalize the costs her departure will inflict
on the community. It should make the option of leaving less financially attractive, and of staying less financially risky.
This alteration in the attractiveness of defecting vis-à-vis cooperating also serves as an assurance. The resident, whose motivations
have been changed, knows that her neighbors’ incentives to defect
have also been decreased. Since she knows that moving has become
costlier for her neighbors, she has more grounds to expect them to
remain.152 Given this assurance that neighbors are likelier to stay,
her inclination to defect decreases. The locking device sparks a reinforcing loop of incentives to stay, which renders the attainment of a
stable community more probable.153
There is no need, though, for an absolute locking device making a
departure impossible. Such a radical solution is only called for by a
Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the cooperative result is not an equilibrium point. Since this is an Assurance Problem, stability and change
are allowed to coexist. Furthermore, because the game does not require such drastic measures, the recommendations it generates survive the relaxation of the assumptions laid at its foundation.
Two of the assumptions made earlier are unrealistic. The first was
that there is an absolute preference for a stable community. This is a
false assumption, as residents might prefer to leave a stable community in certain circumstances and given certain financial rewards.
Therefore, let me now assume a pool of residents, some still holding
the ordering of preferences presented above in the Assurance Problem, while others, added to the pool, do not hold an overriding preference for a stable community. For the latter, option (2)—I defect, other
actor cooperates—and probably even option (3)—I defect, other actor
defects—are preferable to option (1)—I cooperate, other actor cooperates.154 The entry of residents with this preferences ordering to the
152. Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1965, 2007 (2000) (noting that purchasing home equity insurance can signal to other
homeowners an intention to stay in a neighborhood experiencing white flight).
153. Another possible positive effect barriers to exit can have is that of stimulating
“voice”: neighbors who remain in a deteriorating community will work to improve the
neighborhood. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 122, at 79-80. However, the concern has been raised
that people locked in a particular pool against their will may show a tendency not to cooperate,
particularly where they view escape as imminent. Fennell, supra note 110, at 72-73. Such
reservations might not be pertinent to the neighborhood stability context (unlike education),
since non-cooperation will injure the resident’s possible financial reward for leaving.
154. The different way in which the two groups of residents rank their preferences
relates to the two distinct values that an owner derives from her house. Logan and Molotch
use the terms “use value” and “exchange value” to describe these two different benefits.
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pool does not render a stable community unattainable for those other
residents who cling to the original ordering. The reason is that a second unrealistic assumption should be relaxed. I assumed that all
neighbors must cooperate in the creation of a stable community. In
reality, a neighborhood may endure a certain degree of turnover and
remain stable; indeed, as mentioned earlier,155 turnover may in some
instances be needed to maintain stability.
The partial locking device suggested by the analysis based on the
unrealistic assumptions can now be examined in a more realistic
world based on this new set of assumptions where a “mixed game”
exists. With a partial locking device, those newly introduced residents who prefer option (2) to option (1) are still able to move, but the
exercise of this option will become more expensive for them. The result
will, however, remain efficient, as long as the locking device reflects
their actions’ externalities—the harm their departure causes to those
who seek to preserve the community.156 If this harm, now internalized by the mover, is greater than the increase in welfare the mover
gains by moving, she will not move (her ordering of preferences will
change and she will join the group preferring option (1) to option (2)),
which is the efficient result. The externalities of a move will decrease
as the number of residents interested in stability decreases. Therefore
as their number dwindles, the impediment placed on others’ ability to
act on their preference to move lessens. This result is efficient, as it
reflects individuals’ actual preferences: they now prefer moving to
remaining. Even at this point a Prisoner’s Dilemma does not emerge:
if all prefer moving, they may all move without injuring others.157
I can now summarize the conclusions of the neighborhood stability
dilemma. In order to allow residents interested in preserving their
“Exchange value” relates to financial return, and “use value” relates to the essential needs
of life, for example securing a “home.” Their analysis centers upon the interaction between
residents, who prefer use value, and entrepreneurs, who prefer exchange value. LOGAN &
MOLOTCH, supra note 58, at 1-2. My analysis centers upon the interaction between different residents, assuming that different individuals, and indeed each individual, might hold
the two conflicting preferences. Residents hold their houses both as a consumer good and
an investment. The relative importance of these two values is not constant: residents differ
in their attitudes, and over time a resident’s own attitude is susceptible to change.
155. See supra text accompanying note 127.
156. Restraints on alienation within a homeowners association, discussed above, follow
this model. If the action of leaving is more valuable to the seller than her staying is valuable to the community, she will be able to buy from the association its refusal right. If she
cannot offer enough money to persuade it to approve the sale, her staying is more valuable
to the community than her departure is for her, and a decision to sell is indeed inefficient.
Courts should apply this analysis in deciding whether in an association’s exercise of a refusal right is reasonable.
157. When an owner wants to leave the influence the decision of others to leave will
have upon her wellbeing is not as dramatic as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. It might influence to some degree the economic reward she gets, but it will not make her prefer the cooperative result over the result in which all defect. Her first priority is to leave, and thus
possibilities of cooperation are ranked as lower preferences.
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community to do so, the payoffs of leaving the community must be
altered. This alteration is achieved by introducing a partial locking
device, which makes residents contemplating leaving internalize the
costs of their move to the residents left behind who prefer the preservation of neighborhood stability. The partial locking device will entail
subjecting ownership rights to some kind of a community interest in
the property that makes its transfer less attractive. This community
interest is a peculiar right. It is amorphous and fluctuating. Its size
and effect change as the influence of the property owner’s actions on
her neighbors’ preferences for a stable community changes. Nevertheless, it achieves its important goal: it allows owners, otherwise hopelessly
locked in a group dilemma, to enjoy the balance between neighborhood stability and mobility that best suits their personal preferences.
3. Conclusion
Even without ascribing any intrinsic value to the community, law
ought to provide it with protection. Individuals prefer a stable community as a good that allows them to better enjoy their lives. Market
failures prevent them from satisfying this preference, creating a loss
of efficiency. Actions of actors in the real estate market generate externalities that are not internalized. As property rights have historically been created, according to utilitarians, in response to needs for
internalization of externalities,158 a community property right ought
to be established. This right will diminish social losses created by absolute private property rights and allow the internalization of the
harmful effects of an owner’s decision to sell her property.
C. Right-Based Arguments
In the previous Sections justifications for the community interest
in property were sought in theories that view and evaluate reality
through a social prism: the community for the communitarian, aggregate social welfare for the utilitarian. In this Section I will demonstrate that even theories that focus solely on the individual and her
rights, rights that should not be overridden for community goals or collective welfare, support recognizing the community aspect of property.
As Jeremy Waldron defines it, a “right-based argument for private
property is . . . an argument which takes an individual interest to be
sufficiently important in itself to justify holding others (especially the
government) to be under duties to create, secure, maintain, or respect
an institution of private property.” 159 This Section will review two
such individual interests that lie at the heart of influential right158. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
348-50 (1967).
159. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 115 (1988).
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based arguments for private property: personhood and labor-desert.
The Section will demonstrate that neither is sufficiently important to
justify holding others under a duty to maintain absolute individualistic property rights. Both will be shown to justify a duty to respect a
community interest in private property rights.
1. Personhood Theory
No right-based argument for property focuses more on the individual and her powers as an independent owner than personhood
theory. This theory ties the institution of private property to the
owner’s basic attributes of personality; it relates property to a person’s humanity. Still, as the ensuing discussion will show, despite its
avowed individualism, personhood theory’s conception of private
property is incoherent, on its own terms, without recognizing the
community aspect of ownership. In order to serve the important role
that personhood theory assigns to it, ownership must include a community component that will assure the stability of the neighborhood
where the property is situated.
Personhood theory is a tradition originating in the ideas of Aristotle and Hegel.160 Its most prominent modern advocate is Margaret
Radin. Radin claims that certain properties, “personal properties,”
are bound up with personhood,161 and that these properties must be
guaranteed to every person. 162 Such “personal properties” deserve
more extensive protection than other kinds of property—“fungible”
properties—held for purely instrumental reasons.163 The determination
as to which properties constitute “personal properties” is based on
shared understandings.164 Radin and others present the home as the
most striking example of a “personal property.”165 A shared understanding has evolved in American society that housing is not a mere commodity, but a crucial element in allowing people to flourish personally.166
Therefore, personhood theory, as Radin explains, holds that a person should be allowed to have the choice between leaving and remaining in the home and environment—“context”—to which she has
become attached.167 For this reason, property law must extend special
160. Lawrence C. Becker, The Moral Basis of Property Rights, in NOMOS XXII:
PROPERTY 187, 209-10 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). For a survey
and critique of Hegel’s discussion of property see WALDRON, supra note 159, at 351-89.
161. RADIN, supra note 68, at 37.
162. Id. at 36-38, 43.
163. Id. at 53, 55-56.
164. Id. at 11, 18.
165. See, e.g., id. at 56-57, 84; WALDRON, supra note 159, at 296; Joseph William Singer,
The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 682-84 (1988).
166. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 361 (1997).
167. RADIN, supra note 68, at 23-24, 30.
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protection to an owner’s right to keep her home. This protection is
apparent in different bodies of law, such as adverse possession, eminent domain, privacy, takings jurisprudence, and tenant rights.
This legal approach of personhood theory, however, ignores an
important variable: it might assure a person’s option of remaining in
the “context,” yet it does not assure her that the “context”—the community—will remain. Personhood theory envisions the home as a rich
and meaningful social institution, embodying the person’s relationship to herself and her surroundings. But when translating this philosophical notion into property law rules, the theory conceives the
home as merely a parcel of land and four walls to be protected. If it
were to follow its own ideas regarding the home’s role, the theory
would adopt a broader legal attitude to preserving the home. Describing the ideas animating personhood theory, Radin explains:
Contextuality means that physical and social contexts are integral
to personal individuation, to self-development. . . . The relationship
between personhood and context requires a positive commitment to
act so as to create and maintain particular contexts of environment and
community. Recognition of the need for such a commitment turns
toward a positive view of freedom . . . in which proper self-development,
as a requirement of personhood, could in principle sometimes take
precedence over one’s momentary desires or preferences.168

This exploration into the notion of “contextuality” implies a need for
subjecting at times the individual’s impulses to restraints assuring
the context’s survival. Yet the common celebration of the homeowner’s “personal right” by personhood theory ignores this duty
which is essential to being part of a context.
If property law is to respect constitutive attachments, as personhood theory demands, it should strengthen the resident’s right to her
home—the traditional banner of personhood theory—but also provide
disincentives against dissolving the community. This does not mean
that one resident’s option to leave should be blocked so as to allow
another resident to preserve her “context” forever undisturbed. The
first resident too enjoys personhood rights allowing her the same
choice between remaining in her “context” and leaving. Even when
property is conceived as freedom to create the social arrangements a
person desires, the person’s choice does not have conclusive effect,
since other persons—other decisionmakers—are involved.169 However,
rendering the choice to leave the “context” harder is legitimate in
personhood theory’s terms.
A resident choosing to leave her house and neighborhood perceives
the house and neighborhood as “fungible goods,” goods that she can
168. Radin, supra note 61, at 1905.
169. See WALDRON, supra note 159, at 296-97.
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replace. By moving she is actively seeking to replace them, and thus
now these goods only represent in her eyes an instrumental monetary value. In contrast, for the neighbor remaining behind, the context still represents a “personal good.” In the conflict between the two,
the interest of the person for whom the good is a “personal good”
should prevail, according to personhood theory. 170 Therefore the
community’s interest in property, a tool that will make leaving a
neighborhood more difficult as means for preserving the “context,”
can and should become a part of personhood theory.
Without it, and as long as personhood focuses solely on the individual right to a specific asset, personhood theory cannot serve its
own goals of creating property rules that preserve the owner’s personality and deepest attachments. As William Simon notes when critiquing the theory, “[i]t may be harder to assimilate into a new community than to recreate a comfortable home environment, and loss of
membership in a community seems a more serious threat to identity
than loss of a particular dwelling.”171
Simon believes that the community can only be afforded the necessary legal protection under communitarian theories, reviewed in
Section II.A. This conclusion may be too hasty. The emphasis on a
person’s attachment to her community can come not only from a firm
belief in the community, but also from an unwavering dedication to
the person and her needs as a human being. The obligation to preserve the community can be explained within personhood theory’s
framework. This result is conditioned upon the framework being widened, so as to make it, in practice and not only theory, inclusive and
responsive to a person’s attachment to her home and environment.
Only in this manner can personhood theory and its emphasis on personal ties to “context” remain coherent.
2. Labor-Desert Theory
a. The Theory
Personhood theory presents a forceful right-based argument for
private property. Still the most influential right-based argument for
property is found elsewhere—in labor theory. The idea that labor
creates a property right is deeply rooted in legal thought: “It would
seem to be a first principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence, an
axiom of the most fundamental nature, that every person is entitled
to the fruit of his labors unless there are important countervailing
public policy considerations.”172 This idea traces back to the philoso170. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
171. Simon, supra note 98, at 1361.
172. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203,
216 (1954).
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phy of John Locke. Locke’s theory of property holds that by mixing
her labor with an unowned—or rather, owned by the commons—part
of the earth or its fruits, a person makes that part her own.173 The
entitlement to the products of one’s labor is frequently explained by a
notion of desert. Though it is unclear whether this was Locke’s own
intention,174 the labor theory is often read as a desert theory: a person
deserves the product of her work.
If labor is the basis of entitlement to property, it must be defined.
Locke himself did not devote much attention to this matter. Commentators have suggested several alternative notions of labor. One is
the production of something (even if valueless to society) that otherwise would not have existed.175 A second possibility is that only labor
producing something of value to others deserves reward—a “value
added” labor theory. 176 Finally, labor might be an activity that involves pain to the laborer.177
b. The Production of Value
This Article is concerned with rights in a residential unit. More
specifically, it contends that the surrounding community should be
assigned an interest in a house, that it should be entitled to some of
its value. For labor-desert theory, the central task, when assigning
property rights, is to identify the asset’s creator. Thus this Article’s
question, “Who should have a right to the house and its value?”
translates to the question, “Who labored and produced it?” This, in
turn, given the possible definitions of labor, implies an inquiry as to
the identity of those creating the house, adding value to it, or exerting pains in doing so. Is the house’s value “natural?” Is it produced
solely by the dweller? Is it the result of the labor of others who deserve corresponding rights? To answer these questions it is necessary
to address the general issue of the origin and nature of goods’ values.
Until at least the second half of the seventeenth century, scientists believed that when placed in the open air, putrefying meat generates, out of itself, maggots of flies. Following such experiments as
those conducted by Francesco Redi and later Louis Pasteur, this theory of “spontaneous generation” was eventually abandoned.178 Similarly, few will contend today that if a house is placed in a neighbor173. See 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 27-28 (Peter Laslett ed.,
1988). Locke placed limits on the ability to appropriate, none of which are relevant here.
174. WALDRON, supra note 159, at 206.
175. Becker, supra note 160, at 193.
176. Id.; Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,
305 (1988).
177. Id. at 302-03; Lawrence C. Becker, The Labor Theory of Property Acquisition, 73 J.
PHIL. 653, 655-56, 659 (1976).
178. For more on the demise of the theory, see John Farley, The Spontaneous Generation Controversy (1700-1860): The Origins of Parasitic Worms, 5 J. HIST. BIOLOGY 95 (1972).
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hood, it will generate, out of itself, its value. More generally, it is accepted that “our concern for goods . . . . does not arise in spontaneous
consumer need,” as renowned economist John Galbraith put it. 179
Nevertheless, while “spontaneous generation” has long ceased to influence thinking about the natural sciences, the belief that assets’
values are created organically by some natural need still affects our
thinking about the moral justification for an owner’s right to the
value of her asset and any increases in it. The remainder of this Subsection will criticize this outdated idea. In its stead, it will promote
the argument that if the justification for property is that she who labors upon a thing deserves to own it, then when part of the thing’s
value is created by society, society deserves an interest in it.
Philosophers and economists have been noting that the values of
goods, and accordingly their prices, are not natural, but social. Locke
himself distinguished money and other “treasures” from goods that
are naturally needed. “[A]s to Money, and such Riches and Treasure,”
he wrote,
these are none of Natures Goods, they have but a Phantastical
imaginary value: Nature has put no such upon them: They are of
no more account by her standard, than the Wampompeke of the
Americans to an European Prince, or the Silver Money of Europe
would have been formerly to an American.180

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who lamented the replacement of the romantic
state of nature by civilized society, described the latter as an “assemblage of artificial men and factitious passions, which . . . have no
foundation in nature.”181 He viewed civilized man as constantly living
“outside himself,” a man whose needs and desires—anything but
natural—are created by society, and who has hence ceased to be free.182
Like Rousseau, John Stuart Mill was concerned about the modern
separation of actual values and desires from natural needs and “true”
values. Relying on a labor theory and conceiving labor as related to
efforts, Mill criticized the economy of his times, where labor’s rewards were not proportional to the pains exerted.183 Karl Marx’s approach to workers’ entitlements in the nineteenth century was similar. Furthermore, he sought to make people realize that decisions regarding production and distribution are not natural, but are rather
made by men. He believed that the characterization of such decisions
179. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 132 (4th ed. 1984).
180. LOCKE, supra note 173, § 184.
181. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST AND SECOND
DISCOURSES 137 (Susan Dunn ed., 2002).
182. Id. at 122-23, 137-38. On Rousseau’s thesis that man has come to live outside of
himself see ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 53-54 (1984).
183. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 235-36 (Jonathan Riley
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1848).
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as natural consequences of properties of the produced commodities,
accompanied by the claim that value is intrinsic to the commodity,
were means of concealing the true nature of these decisions and values.184 In reality, they are events that individuals themselves bring
about through concrete social activities. By hiding this reality, an
illusion is created that the actual patterns of production and distribution are the necessary ones.185
These insights have been largely incorporated into twentieth century theories of markets and prices. As already seen, Galbraith attacked the myth of consumer sovereignty. He emphasized that preferences and demand were to some degree created by production—the
same activity depicted as reacting to consumer needs.186 Similarly,
Walzer argues that goods themselves are inter-subjective, and not
objective, creations:
All the goods with which distributive justice is concerned are social
goods. . . . Goods in the world have shared meanings because conception and creation are social processes. For the same reason,
goods have different meanings in different societies. The same
‘thing’ is valued for different reasons, or it is valued here and disvalued there.187

Ross Zucker elaborates on the impact of this realization upon concepts of justice and equality. Social influences—generated by all
community members—greatly affect the formation and character of
individuals’ consumer wants, which determine economic value.
Zucker explains that needs are formed in an interdependent, intersubjective manner because the individual constitutes herself so as to
accommodate others’ needs; she must be able to provide others with
means to satisfy their needs so she can receive in exchange means to
satisfy her needs.188 She must also develop her needs in a manner
that will enable them to be satisfied by things other persons provide.189 The capitalist system is thus sustained by common action of
all the members of the economic community.190 Zucker concludes that
every member of the economic community should be entitled to an
equal share of some of the national income, as each contributed to
its creation.191

184. Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism
of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 969, 984 (1985).
185. See id. at 968-88.
186. GALBRAITH, supra note 179, at 131-33.
187. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
7 (1983).
188. ROSS ZUCKER, DEMOCRATIC DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 29-30, 112-13 (2001).
189. Id. at 113.
190. Id. at 206, 238.
191. Id. at 86-88, 119, 254-55.
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c. The Production of Residential Properties’ Value
All these arguments highlight the social nature of the economic
value of assets, which is evident in the case of residential properties.
In his book The Production of Space, discussing urban space in general, the influential French sociologist and philosopher, Henri Lefebvre, wrote that “Space is permeated with social relations; it is not
only supported by social relations but it is also producing and produced by social relations.”192 The value of a house is the product of
many factors, only one of which is the structure’s quality and the
owner’s patterns of investment in it. Other impactful factors are generated by the surrounding community. First, much of the change in a
house’s value is the outcome of public investment in the city, of
changes in the regional and national economy, and of changes in the
way the real estate market is regulated and taxed.193 Second, an upgrade to one property may improve the market value of nearby properties (neglect will have similar, though detrimental, effects). 194
Hence, some of the value of my property is created by the investment
of my neighbor in her property. Third, the house’s value is influenced
by neighborhood context. In the dynamics associated with neighborhood change, areal factors play a major role.195 The value of my property is a function of the common perception of my neighborhood: if
others view it as up-and-coming and desirable, the value will increase. If they perceive it as declining, the value will decrease.196 The
stigma or status conferred on a particular neighborhood distorts the
allocation of resources.197 Rolf Goetze goes as far as stating that actual events such as changes in credit availability and facts regarding
turnover rates often go unnoticed when deciding whether to live in a
neighborhood and invest in a house, until reported by the media.198
Neighborhood confidence, which determines property values, is produced by attitudes’ change, rather than by housing obsolescence.199
A house’s value is deeply influenced by social perceptions. Hence,
labor-desert ideas can hardly justify the owner’s entitlement to the
full increase in its value. The owner did not create it alone. The same
goes for decreases in value. This conclusion holds, no matter which

192. HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 286 (Donald Nicholson-Smith tr.,
1991) (emphasis added).
193. JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, NAT’L HOUS. INST., SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP: THE
CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF RESALE-RESTRICTED, OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING 65 (2006).
194. See generally Barnes, supra note 136, at 41-45 (examining the rehabilitation experience in Boston’s South End and its impact on property values).
195. HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 192 (Roger Montgomery &
Daniel R. Mandelker eds., 2d ed. 1979).
196. See Leven et al., supra note 133, at 199.
197. GOETZE, supra note 111, at 31.
198. Id. at 61.
199. Id. at 62.
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meaning of labor is adopted. The owner did not create something new,
the added value was not wholly due to her efforts, and the pains she
suffered are limited to those associated with improvements she made,
which form only part of the story. The community, on the other hand,
labored on the asset and accordingly deserves reward. It created
something new: a trendy neighborhood where previously there was a
forgotten one. This something new is of value to society. Finally, efforts were made by the community: the improvement in the perception of one neighborhood normally entails the deterioration of that of
others—the harms caused to those other neighborhoods are “pains”
the community endured. 200
d. Conclusion
Part of the change in a residential unit’s value is due to changing
attributes of the community where it is situated. These attributes are
created not by the unit’s owner, but by public perceptions or economic
circumstances, improvements to neighbors’ houses, and government
investment in infrastructure. As John Morgan and Harvey Molotch
conclude, in the market for places and homes “price is sociological.”201
There is nothing “natural” about it.202 Therefore, in accordance with
notions of desert, the community that labored on creating part of the
asset’s value should maintain a property right in that part: the community aspect of property.
Still, a caveat must be added regarding this application of
Lockean theory. The relationship of the preceding analysis to labor
theory is complicated. The discussion is consonant with the theory’s
spirit and logic, yet the theory as written by Locke might not accommodate it. Locke’s theory was a theory of first appropriation: the first
man who labors on an unowned asset is entitled to own it. After this
appropriation, a later laborer on the same—but now owned—asset
will acquire nothing. Locke’s is a theory of natural rights, of historical entitlements.203 As such, it encounters difficulties in acknowledging any property interest in the house credited to the community (or
anyone else) after an original owner acquired the asset. Theories of
natural rights are static theories; they thus might be irrelevant to
real-world problems of a developed interdependent society. I will address this difficulty in the following two Subsections.

200. On the harms gentrification in one neighborhood inflicts on other neighborhoods,
see Peter Marcuse, Gentrification, Abandonment, and Displacement: Connections, Causes,
and Policy Responses in New York City, 28 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 195, 216-17 (1985).
201. LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 58, at 9.
202. WALDRON, supra note 159, at 138.
203. Id.
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3. Property as a Natural Right
The preceding discussion explored two right-based arguments justifying property rights and concluded that they call for recognizing a
community interest in such rights. This might not have been the case
had those right-based arguments been read as natural right theories
of property. The strongest opposition to the community interest in
private property stems from natural rights theories. I will now point
at the concerns raised by these theories and highlight the problematic nature of their understanding of the role and law of property.
A natural rights and historical entitlement system is not a specific
right-based argument justifying property. The natural right to property can emerge from whatever source—labor and personhood being
two contenders. The key element in a natural rights/historical entitlement philosophy is that afterwards—after the right’s original creation—it is forever protected. The particular rule that determines the
just origin of the property right is only of secondary importance.
Therefore, Robert Nozick, the most prominent philosopher of the
historical entitlement theory, refrains from formulating the “principles of justice in acquisition,” though they are an important component in his system of justice.204 Nozick holds that in a just world, a
person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principles of
justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.205 The only way another person can become entitled to that holding is by acquiring it
from her in accordance with the “principle of justice in transfer” (also
not detailed by Nozick).206 This is a historical theory of justice in distribution, rather than an end-result theory of justice. The determination whether a distribution is just depends upon how it came about,
and not upon how things are distributed at the present.207 For the
existing system of property to be just, it must be the result of transfers of assets from those who acquired them in accordance with the
original principle of acquisition. If those transfers were made following the governing rules of transfer then the result is just—regardless
of its specific character.
Such a theory would arguably deny the introduction of the community’s interest in property. Nozick differentiates his principles of
justice from “patterned” principles of distribution.208 The latter specify
“that a distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension,
weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of
natural dimensions.”209 According to his theory, if a distribution is
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150, 153 (1974).
Id. at 151.
Id.
Id. at 153-55.
Id. at 155-56.
Id. at 156.
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arrived at by the principles of historical entitlement, it is just, no
matter how “unpatterned” and random.210 Hence arguments for distribution according to “patterns” of moral merit, needs, or marginal
product, are alien to the system.211 The claims made in the former two
Subsections that the community is entitled to an interest in property
because of notions of desert or due to individual needs for maintaining constitutive attachments are irrelevant to a Nozickean system.
This denial is reinforced when the role of first acquisition is further strengthened, as it is by other writers in the natural rights tradition. The desire to acquire is sometimes presented as inherent to
human nature: a biological instinct or an uncontrollable psychological
impulse, serving both as means for survival and tool for selffulfillment. For this reason property is understood as a natural right,
predating organized society.212 On a less abstract and deterministic
note, first possession has been justified as the source of property due
to its alleged enduring role in most societies.213
If first acquisition or possession is the controlling factor, it is hard
to argue for an interest emerging for the community’s benefit in a
house already acquired and possessed. It is not, however, an impossible argument to make. Individuals can maintain natural rights in
assets they acquired, and still those rights may be subject to limitations, even in a natural rights/libertarian world—if the individuals
choose the limitations. The property right voluntarily restricted exante is a complicated issue for libertarian approaches.214 On the one
hand, such theories object to limits placed on property rights. On the
other hand, they celebrate individual choice. Nozick’s assignment of a
key role to voluntary communities is thus highly intriguing.215 The
proliferation of these communities represents utopia for Nozick. His
utopia is a framework—a minimal state—within which many societies
exist, each living its members’ idea of the utopian society. Every
group of persons sharing the same idea of utopia may come together
and realize its ideal. Internally, the different communities may impose restrictions on their members to assure the realization of their
utopia. Had they been imposed by the state, these restrictions would
have been unjustifiable on libertarian grounds. Yet the different communities may enforce these limitations on freedom. For example, a
communist community may redistribute wealth between its members,

210. Id. at 156-58.
211. See id. at 155-60.
212. See RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 65-86, 286 (1999).
213. Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1241-43 (1979).
214. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 43 (2004).
215. Nozick is a strong proponent of free contract: he believes that an individual should
be allowed to sell himself into slavery. NOZICK, supra note 204, at 331.
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while the central government may not redistribute wealth between
communities.216
It may follow that the different communities should be preserved
so that they can continue to live diverse utopias, thereby allowing
each person to choose her utopia. However, Nozick emphasizes that
the system should be based on a person’s ability to leave one community and move to another.217 Community stability is to be achieved by
the payoffs the community awards each member, persuading her to
stay.218 Nozick’s utopia consists of “a world which all rational inhabitants may leave for any other world they can imagine . . . an association,” and not of a “world in which some rational inhabitants are not
permitted to emigrate to some of the associations they can imagine,
an east-berlin [sic].”219
But at the same time, Nozick acknowledges that absolute rights to
leave a community lead to an impasse:
[P]roblems arise if an individual can plausibly be viewed as owing
something to the other members of the community he wishes to
leave: for example, he has been educated at their expense on the
explicit agreement that he would use his acquired skills and
knowledge in the home community. Or, he has acquired certain
family obligations that he will abandon by shifting communities.
Or, without such ties, he wishes to leave. What may he take out
with him? . . . Clearly the principles will be complicated ones.220

If the idea of “owing something” to the community is broadly conceived, loyalty and a duty to allow peers to continue living their utopia may serve as justifications for making leaving a community more
difficult. Recall the issues explored in Section II.B.2.ii.: the
Nozickean utopia is analogous to Tiebout’s model of the market for
local public goods. While Tiebout’s individuals shop for municipalities,
Nozick’s shop for utopias. Accordingly, Nozick’s utopia encounters
problems similar to those that Tiebout’s model faced, namely the
damage inflicted to the community by every departure. This problem
renders the visions impossible to realize. Like Tiebout’s model,
Nozick’s utopia can be saved only following the introduction of reasonable controls allowing communities’ survival without turning
them into “east-berlins.” This idea might, to the superficial observer,
contrast the notion of the minimal state, which is Nozick’s framework
for utopia.221 But the minimal state always plays an active role in

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See generally id. at 297-334.
Id. at 302, 317.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 333-34.
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protecting property rights,222 or—in Nozick’s terms—in rectifying deviations from the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer. So
why must it refrain from acting to protect a certain form of property
right and community desired by owners?
These ambiguities make it difficult to assess the response of libertarian thinking to the reinforcement of voluntary associations’ powers. They are symptoms of libertarianism’s general deficiencies. The
theory is attractive as it offers clear-cut notions of justice, freedom,
and property; but, for the same reason, it is also unrealistic. It fails to
recognize the complex nature of property rights. In a world with more
than one owner, property rights conflict and regulation must be introduced to determine which right shall prevail.223 This Article demonstrates the problem: while one owner—for example Ms. Rodriguez
of the Introduction—seeks to preserve her property right as it were,
another demands to secure her ability to use or transfer her property
right as she pleases. Yet if the latter is allowed to act, the former
cannot maintain her property right in its current condition. Answers
to such conflicts—between one owner’s security and another’s freedom—cannot be found by resorting to an endorsement of “natural
property rights” and to a denial of “regulation,” because property
rights are found on both sides of the dispute. Society, not nature,
picks the winners in such contests.
4. Property as a Social Phenomenon
The natural rights conception of property is juxtaposed with a
very different idea regarding the origin of property, explained by
Rousseau in this famous excerpt:
The first man, who after enclosing a piece of ground, took it into
his head to say, this is mine, and found people simple enough to
believe him, was the real founder of civil society. How many
crimes . . . how many misfortunes and horrors, would that man
have saved the human species, who pulling up the stakes or filling
up the ditches should have cried to his fellows: Beware of listening
to this impostor; you are lost, if you forget that the fruits of the
earth belong equally to us all, and the earth itself to nobody!224

This conception of property rights as a social phenomenon that could
not have antedated society shatters any pretences of sanctity on the
part of property rights. First acquisition can no longer be portrayed
as natural. In a style reminiscent of Rousseau, Carol Rose explains
the common law’s acceptance of first acquisition as ownership’s origin
by its being a manner for communicating a message, a “text” intelli222. Singer, supra note 165, at 651.
223. SINGER, supra note 20, at 94, 171-74.
224. ROUSSEAU, supra note 181, at 113.
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gible to others. It therefore is not enough for the person to say “it’s
mine”; “some relevant world must understand the claim it makes and
take that claim seriously.”225 First possession is “the articulation of a
specific vocabulary within a structure of symbols approved and understood by a commercial people.”226
Property rights can only exist within a society. They are not a
natural right that cannot be modified after the individual enters society. As society defines the right, it may set the right’s limits.227 This
conception of property makes it easier to recognize the need to reward the community’s labor on the creation of the house’s value, and
to constrain property rights in residential units in a manner that will
better protect owners’ personhood.
More importantly, this social conception of property allows an understanding of property that integrates the different theoretical approaches explored in this Part of the Article. Joseph Singer has proposed replacing the ownership model with an entitlement model,
which will direct attention to the way in which property law structures relations.228 He explains that property rules not only protect
individual rights, but also form the overall social context in which
individuals live.229 Accordingly, the property rules chosen are those
that shape the contours of social relations in a manner which accords
with our considered judgments about the appropriate forms of social
life. The central normative goal of property law is to protect justified
expectations. The decision as to what constitutes justified expectations relies both on utilitarian and right-based arguments.230 As seen
in this Section, right-based arguments, both those appealing to labordesert and those appealing to personhood, lead to the conclusion that
the expectation that a neighbor will not easily leave her fellows behind, is justified. Utilitarian arguments, explored in the preceding
Section, and communitarian ideas, reviewed still earlier, converge on
the same result.
These insights counsel that emphasis be placed upon the relations
that develop between neighbors. This is indeed the approach advocated by Singer:
The relational approach shifts our attention from asking “Who is
the owner?” to the question “What relationships have been established?” The shift is partly a shift from focusing on the relation between the owner and the resources owned to the relation between

225. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 81, 8485 (1985).
226. Id. at 88.
227. See Singer, supra note 165, at 647-48, 650-51.
228. SINGER, supra note 20, at 91.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 90, 130-39, 146, 210-12.
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the owner and non-owners who have benefited from the resources.
But more important, the shift is from a perspective that focuses on
the owner as an isolated individual whose presumptive control of
the resource is absolute within her sphere of power to a perspective that understands individuals to be in a continuing relation to
each other as part of a common enterprise.231

This property theory has been applied to gentrification and
neighborhood change. One researcher found that neighborhood activists in Vancouver based their struggle against development that
would have led to gentrification and displacement on an alleged
community property right in a privately owned department store and
a public park.232 Residents viewed themselves as owners of the properties, in defiance of the classical ownership model.233 They invoked
the entitlement model arguing that these properties became part of
the community.234
In this manner the relational theory was enlisted to regulate the
relations between the community and external forces. It can guide
the internal relations between neighborhood residents just as well.
The relationship between residents should be viewed as constituting
a common enterprise—a community—on which all residents are dependent. The residents rely on the relationship’s continuity: they invest in their houses and make them the center of their lives, based on
an assumption that their relationship with their surroundings, which
benefits all involved, will persist. The reliance on such relationships
should be protected. 235 Owners should have property rights—
community property rights—in the private holdings of their neighbors.
Property rights are the creation of society, not nature or god. As
such, society may model property rights according to its conceptions
of individuals’ needs, of justice and desert, and of desired social relationships. Hence property rights should be recognized when people
reasonably rely on existing relationships with others. Reliance on the
character of one’s environment, on lasting interactions with surrounding people, is something that socially created property rights
seek to promote.
5. Conclusion
Right-based arguments, in their vast majority, necessitate the
protection of the community’s interest in private property. The community is entitled to such an interest as a reward for its labor on the
231. Singer, supra note 165, at 657.
232. NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING THE CITY: URBAN LAND AND THE POLITICS OF
PROPERTY 37-53 (2004).
233. Id. at 55-65.
234. Id. at 73-74.
235. See Singer, supra note 165, at 661.
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creation of a portion of a house’s value. This interest is also vital in
order to enable the existence of the individual’s personhood and to
safeguard her “personal properties,” which cannot be detached from
the “context” where she lives. Even if these or other right-based arguments are regarded as creating natural property rights, they may
still be understood as requiring the protection of certain communities—certain forms of property—that people voluntarily choose. Regardless, social conceptions of property rights may be deemed preferable to natural rights worldviews. From the perspective of these relational readings of rights, the absence of protection for the community’s interest in ownership is particularly troubling.
D. Conclusion
This Part of the Article has explored diverse property theories and
illustrated how they all could support—indeed, necessitate—the recognition of the community aspect of private ownership. It must be
stressed, however, that the fact that communitarianism, welfare economics, and rights-based arguments all converge on this conclusion
does not imply that their rationalizations are identical or that the
specific contributions they make are useful for the same purposes.
Thus, for example, communitarianism provides us with a rich understanding of the meaning and import of the neighborhood, but it falls
short in putting forward detailed principles for regulating the relationship between the neighborhood and the individual: for balancing
neighborhood stability against individual freedom. Welfare economics
presents the groundwork for such a balancing scheme, but the intangible value of the neighborhood is, too often, not a natural element in
its calculus. Rights-based arguments ground the community aspect of
ownership in the very powerful tradition and rhetoric of property
rights, but, as each right-based explanation isolates one salient attribute of reality, such accounts’ notion of community is rather thin.
Those not exclusively attached to one specific theory will draw in a
pragmatic manner on all of them when considering the community
aspect of ownership. Those adhering to one or another of the theories
are bound to view the community aspect in divergent lights. That being said—they are still likely to view it favorably.
III. THE COMMUNITY ASPECT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND PROPERTY
LAW PRACTICE: A PROPOSAL
A clear conclusion emerged from Part II of the Article. The community’s interest in property should be recognized. But how can this
goal be achieved? How—if at all—can the community aspect of property don a practical garb? The impetus for challenging property law
theory to recognize the community interest was provided by a real
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world problem presented in the Introduction. It originated in a difficulty faced by actual owners whose neighborhoods are destabilized. It
is thus important that the community aspect of ownership not be
constricted to the realm of theory. This Part of the Article will suggest one possible way of giving it concrete substance. I will propose a
scheme that will grant the community the partnership interest in
assets’ value to which it is entitled, in a way that can alleviate the
plight of owners whose community is threatened.
The proposal distinguishes two disparate situations: one where
properties’ market values are increasing dramatically—the conditions characteristic of an improving/gentrifying neighborhood—and
another where property values are decreasing dramatically—the
common occurrence in a declining neighborhood.
A. An Improving Neighborhood
In the improving neighborhood the traditional individualized notion of property and the community-invested idea of property, introduced by this Article, contrast most strikingly. Therefore Ms. Rodriguez’s story served as a good illustration of the problem property law
faces. In a gentrifying neighborhood properties’ monetary values increase, while the community aspect of those same properties is
threatened. Local residents are displaced. The owners among them—
like Ms. Rodriguez—might be able to reap a profit when selling. Yet
they lose their community, which was a constitutive element of their
property right and the enjoyment they derived from it.
In light of the fact that, as already seen, this result is inefficient
and unjust, what should be the policy response? I suggest imposing a
tax calculated as a percentage of the profit made in selling property
and collected at the time of sale, accompanied by rent control. The
tax rates are to be set according to the intensity of gentrification,
with higher taxes levied the more intense the process. The establishment of such a tax corresponds to the requirements of the theoretical approaches reviewed in Part II. The tax will deter sales since
it will render them less lucrative, thereby carrying a stabilizing effect.236 In this manner it will convey upon residents better chances at
preserving their attachment to their neighborhood, as suggested by
communitarian and personhood theories. It will make emigrants internalize their departure’s costs, thereby solving the collective action
problem identified by utilitarian theories. It will compensate those
remaining behind for the upsetting of their reliance and expectations,
as required by relational theories. The tax will also be a reward to
236. For a similar proposal of a sales tax aimed at deterring further destabilization and
resegregation in neighborhoods undergoing racial integration, see Bell & Pachomovsky,
supra note 152, at 2009-11.
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society for its work on the creation of the increase in the house’s
value, a reward merited in accordance with labor-desert theory.
The tax will be levied at sale. At that time, the difference between
the price for which the owner bought the house, and the price for
which she is selling it, will be taxed. Subtractions should be introduced for improvements she made to the property, as well as for general increases in housing prices in the entire region and nation.
The best way to understand these characteristics of the proposed
tax is by identifying the tax’s relationship to other taxes to which
property owners are subject. The proposed tax, like existing property
taxes, will be paid to a local authority. Another similarity between
these two taxes lies in their normative structure. The tax contemplated is based to some degree on the “benefit tax” principle of taxation, as property taxes are held to be.237 The benefit principle of taxation
dictates that a person be taxed in keeping with the amount of benefit
she derives from services provided by the relevant governmental
body. Property taxes represent a payment a homeowner makes for
her enjoyment of local public services. More importantly, these services
enhance property values. Hence, when paying property taxes, calculated
based on her home’s value, the taxpayer is paying the local government
consideration for its services. Similarly, the proposed tax will be paid
in accordance with the contribution the community, via public and
private investment, made to the value of the taxpayer’s asset.
But unlike property taxes, the proposed tax will only be paid when
the investment is realized—upon the occurrence of a sale. In this feature, the tax is comparable to the capital gains tax, which forms a
part of the income tax.238 The reason for emulating the capital gains
tax in this regard is obvious; levying the suggested tax while the
owner is still occupying the house will achieve a result opposite to the
desired outcome. Subjecting homeowners in a gentrifying neighborhood to higher taxes puts further pressure on them, making displacement practically unavoidable.239 Conditioning the tax on a sale
relates it to the principle of taxation according to ability to pay
(which contrasts the benefit principle of taxation)—the guiding principle in income taxation.240 A homeowner is being taxed according to
her ability to pay since she only pays the tax when she is in actual
237. See William A. Fischel, Municipal Corporations, Homeowners and the Benefit View
of the Property Tax, in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 33 (Wallace
E. Oates ed., 2001).
238. For more on taxation upon realization, see Charles T. Terry, Normative Capital
Cost Recovery for a Realization-based Income Tax, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 467 (2002).
239. Property taxes might be viewed as undermining property rights, since they might
compel owners to sell their properties. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 496 (6th ed. 2003).
240. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC
ECONOMY 61-63 (1959).
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possession of the funds representing the increase in her home’s value,
i.e., after she sold it for a profit. Nevertheless, the tax does not truly
embody the taxpayer’s ability to pay. Unlike income taxation, the
proposed tax is paid without considering the taxpayer’s overall
wealth. It only deals with income gained from one source—the sale of
a house. Such an approach naturally deviates from the ability to pay
principle, which sets taxes according to the taxpayer’s entire income. 241 It also contradicts a major aspiration of income taxation,
which is to tax similarly different investments, so as not to distort
capital market decisions (i.e., not to have investors choose an investment solely because it is taxed favorably).242 The proposed tax targets
a specific investment—residential units—while leaving other investments untouched. Still, this is not a problem: the tax explicitly aims
at “distorting” decisions in this one market.
Because of these major differences the tax is neither an addition
to the capital gains tax, nor a part of its normative structure. Rather,
it in some ways evokes Henry George’s late nineteenth century proposed comprehensive taxation of land value as a single tax. 243 Although rejected in most jurisdictions, 244 that proposal still exerts
much influence on the way scholars think about land taxation.245 The
famed economist and politician envisioned one single tax whose
amount is determined solely by the value of land, discounting structures built on it. He believed that such a tax would be both efficient
and progressive in incidence. In addition, he saw it as just, since
land’s value increases due to social and economic developments, as
well as governmental investment, while owners do practically nothing to bring about such value increases. Hence, George did not believe that landowners earn these increments in value and conceived
owners as occupying a different position than individuals who contribute labor and capital to production and earn their compensation.246 This Article’s community interest in property, as explained in
Section II.C.2., shares this rationale, though it does not separate the
value of buildings from the value of land. In addition, the tax sug241. On determining a taxpayer’s income, see HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME
TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 49-50 (1938) and
Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in READINGS IN
THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54, 75 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959).
242. See John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax
Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2095, 2138 (2000).
243. See generally HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (1942).
244. Pennsylvania is the main exception. J. Anthony Coughlan, Land Value Taxation
and Constitutional Uniformity, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 261, 262 (1999).
245. See, e.g., LAND VALUE TAXATION: CAN IT AND WILL IT WORK TODAY? (Dick Netzer
ed., 1998).
246. See generally Coughlan, supra note 244, at 263-68 (examining arguments in favor
of land value taxation).
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gested has no aspirations at replacing other forms of taxation, in
stark contrast to George’s plan.
Now that the proposed tax has been situated among other taxation schemes, and its roles and characteristics clarified, it is necessary, in order to evaluate its effects, to try and predict who will actually pay it. Foreseeing the economic incidence of a tax247 is practically
impossible, as it depends, among other factors, on the elasticities of
supply and demand.248 As far as the relationship between seller and
buyer is concerned, this is not a major worry: whether the
owner/seller pays the tax, or whether she passes the tax on to the
buyer, the tax’s purposes are attained. In both scenarios, the sale is
deterred, and either the owner moving out or the in-mover internalizes the move’s costs to the neighborhood.
The incidence of the tax does raise a concern with regards to the
possibility that owners will pass it on not to potential buyers, but to
tenants. When sales’ profits are taxed, owners have an incentive to
lease their properties for higher rents rather than sell them.249 Theoretically, rent proceeds should be taxed as sale proceeds since the two
are economically equivalent. However, the danger is that landlords
will pass on, via higher rents, rent income tax to current tenants,
leading to displacement and the community’s demise. A better approach, thus, is to avoid taxing rent income. Instead, the sales tax
should be supplemented by a more traditional rent control policy.
Rent control prevents landlords from increasing rents beyond a set
amount representing fair return on their investment. It thereby prevents higher-income in-movers from outbidding lower-income tenants.250 The rent control suggested here correlates to the taxation of
sales and is thus justified on the same grounds justifying the tax: it is
an embodiment of the community’s interest in the asset. Rent control
will check owners’ ability to realize value increases by leasing for
higher rents, thereby evading the tax levied at sale. It will allow this
Article’s proposal, which otherwise centers on homeowners, to convey
benefits directly to tenants. Rent control is probably the only tool
that can effectively help tenants stay in a gentrifying community.251

247. The economic incidence of the tax relates to the identity of the party who is unable
to pass along the burden of the tax. It need not correlate to the legal incidence.
248. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1996); Walter Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State Tax Discrimination, 39 TAX LAW.
405, 438-42 (1986).
249. For a similar scenario with a land improvement tax, see POSNER, supra note 239,
at 496.
250. Rent control has been controversial for years. For an overview of the debate, see
SINGER, supra note 148, at 777-81. For the debate in the context of gentrification, compare
Molly McUsic, Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying Housing Market, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835 (1988) with Minton, supra note 95.
251. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 426 (2003).
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Aiding tenants is necessary for the realization of the community interest in ownership, as their displacement threatens the community.
B. A Declining Neighborhood
This Article focused on the operation of the community interest in
a gentrifying neighborhood. However, as has been made clear, the
community aspect of property is operable in all situations, and community stability is at threat in declining neighborhoods as well. In
fact, the declining neighborhood presents an easier case for justifying
the community interest in property. Maintaining it in such neighborhoods implies combating the drop in property values, and thus it correlates to traditional individualized understandings of property protection. However, when it comes to practical implementation, the challenge of protecting the community’s interest in such neighborhoods
might be more complex than in improving neighborhoods. The reason
is that the theoretical justifications for the community interest explored
in Part II of this Article may diverge in their recommendations here.
When understood as created by society, the decrease in property
values calls for a transfer of funds from society to the owner/seller,
perhaps in the form of a negative tax.252 As seen in Section II.B.2, society is the entity responsible for locations losing appeal. If the community is a silent partner in land ownership, partaking in its benefits (as suggested by the tax discussed above), it should also share in
the losses.
However, the stabilizing effect of such a scheme is questionable at
best. A promising precedent is the experience of Oak Park, Illinois.
When, during the 1970s, the Chicago community bordering Oak Park
became segregated following white flight and neighborhood decline,
the Oak Park community fought back by enacting an equity assurance plan.253 The plan—financed by a one percent general tax on all
local properties—is open to any single-family homeowner that enrolls
by paying a fee covering the cost of appraisal.254 An appraisal is then
made of the home’s value. Five years after the owner enters the program, the protection sets in, and if an owner is unable to sell her
residence at the appraised value, she is reimbursed for eighty percent
of the loss.255 The plan has been perceived as a success: no owner has

252. The term negative tax describes government payments made to citizen through
the tax system instead of the welfare system. See James Tobin, Joseph Pechman & Peter M.
Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical? 77 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1967).
253. Maureen A. McNamara, The Legality and Efficacy of Homeowner’s Equity Assurance: A Study of Oak Park, Illinois, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1466-67 (1984).
254. Id. at 1468.
255. Id.
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ever sought reimbursement and the community remains remarkably
stable. As a result, other municipalities adopted similar programs.256
Still, in Oak Park the municipality promised to reimburse owners
for eighty percent of their losses. It is doubtful whether less affluent
locales could assume such a financial burden. Yet if they solely
pledge partial compensation for owners’ losses, the chances of replicating Oak Park’s success dramatically decrease. A partial monetary
compensation might not hand the owner a strong enough incentive to
refrain from selling; she might fear the cost of waiting will be greater.257
Therefore, another policy tool should be developed. One possible
approach might be lowering property taxes using public funding
(generated by the proposed tax collected in improving neighborhoods)
to finance the ensuing tax deficit. It is imperative that local authorities
advise residents that the same level of public services will be maintained (or even enhanced) despite the decrease in property taxes. At
times of abandonment city government often reduces services, or at
least does not keep up with the greater needs of the poor neighborhood. 258 It thereby, if only inadvertently, intensifies the spiral of
neighborhood decline. In contrast, assurances that public investments in the neighborhood will remain steady, accompanied by the
decrease in living costs, serve as incentives to stay.259 They help preserve the community. The plan plays a role in reinstating neighborhood
confidence, which, as seen in Section II.B.2.iii., is vital to neighborhood recovery. Indeed, property tax abatements have been known to
encourage private investment in neighborhood rehabilitation.260
Furthermore, this plan, despite its eschewal of straightforward
reimbursements for property value losses, is not inconsistent with
the community interest’s goal of reflecting the partnership between
owner and neighborhood. Though not a direct transfer of funds, this
scheme provides compensation for losses created by society: studies
show that fiscal factors, namely tax rates and per capita municipal

256. See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 95/1-20 (West 2010). On the plan elsewhere,
see Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 152, at 2005 n.136, 2006 n.140.
257. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
258. HALLMAN, supra note 56, at 218.
259. Theoretically, any price stabilization scheme could also lead to the opposite result:
it may induce moves. When the market trends downward, owners may refuse to accept
prices that are lower than those the properties could have commanded earlier, and therefore they tend to stay put. The reason is liquidity constraints and also loss aversion. Once
the market is stabilized, owners are thus less hesitant to sell. Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1109-10 (2008). While this may be true to some
extent in the general market, deteriorating neighborhoods normally, as seen, experience an
exodus of residents. In such places, the pre-intervention baseline is excessive mobility,
rather than the lack thereof.
260. Judith Bernstein-Baker, Cooperative Conversion: Is It Only for the Wealthy? Proposals that Promote Affordable Cooperative Housing in Philadelphia, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 393,
419 & n.229 (1988).
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expenditures, are capitalized into house values.261 Hence, under the
plan suggested here, the community will monetarily compensate the
homeowner whose house decreased in value: the more favorable fiscal
environment will offset part of the decrease in the asset’s value.262
IV. THE COMMUNITY ASPECT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND OTHER
LEGAL PROBLEMS
Part III of this Article translated Part II’s theoretical insights into
practice by suggesting a plan implementing the community’s interest
in residential properties. This Article’s theoretical insights have implications for the design and defense of still other rules of law. This
concluding part of the Article will briefly review several such implications. I will highlight rules in other fields of property law that are, or
can be, justified by reference to concepts similar to the community
interest. I will also use the Article’s thesis to suggest reforms in several of these rules. The discussion of each example will be merely introductory. My goal is to point at directions for further research, and
I entertain no pretensions of engaging a full exploration of each and
every example.
The discussion will be divided into three groupings of legal issues:
properties other than residential housing, nuisance law, and intellectual property law.
A. Properties Other than Residential Units
This Article focused on the need to subject residential ownership
to a community interest. The thesis relates to earlier calls for the acknowledgment of a similar interest in factories,263 and commercial and
public assets important to a community.264 Several other assets with
similar attributes, in which a community may claim an interest, exist.

261. For a survey of these studies, see Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use
Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473,
521-22 (1991).
262. The plan proposed in this Part of the Article, in both its facets, can be viewed as a
form of home-equity insurance. It insulates, to some extent, the homeowner from decreases
in the value of her home that are beyond her control. The premium she pays for this insurance is the loss of the ability to realize some of the increases in the value of said home. For
an example of a scheme reimagining property rights in a way that will allow for the
easier provision of home equity insurance, see Fennell, supra note 259. The program as
proposed in this Article is a form of public—rather than private—insurance. Such an approach to the provision of the relevant insurance product might be justified as moral hazards are likely precluding its provision by private insurers. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER,
MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING SOCIETY’S LARGEST ECONOMIC
RISKS 79, 82-83 (1993).
263. See Singer, supra note 165.
264. See BLOMLEY, supra note 232.

814

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:759

1. Places of Worship
Church closings have become a major issue over the past few
years.265 Faced with declining attendance and mounting costs, archdioceses close churches that no longer appear viable. But worshippers
feel that their churches should not be treated as standard assets with
which the owner—the Catholic Church—can do as it pleases. They
perceive themselves as entitled to a holding in what is not just a real
estate commodity, but also an institution central to their communities and lives. Though not cloaked in legal terms, this is a debate
about ownership rights in churches.
Throughout the years, courts have dealt with ownership in church
properties mainly when confronted with controversies between religious fractions, arising out of a schism. Difficulties in deciding these
cases stem from the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Because of the latter, the Supreme Court has held
that courts adjudicating such disputes must refrain from analyzing
religious doctrines in an effort to determine which fraction is “loyal”
to the church’s tenets.266 Rather, the Court has suggested two alternative approaches. Under the first, courts must defer to the church’s
governmental structure. This structure may be hierarchal (as in the
Roman Catholic Church) or congregational (as with Judaism and
Baptist Christianity). If the church’s governance is hierarchical, ownership of church properties resides with the church’s highest authority, whose decisions are binding even when arbitrary or fraudulent. If
the church is organized on a congregational basis, each congregation
owns its own property and governs it. Under the second approach
legitimized by the Court for settling controversies over church properties, a court is to apply “neutral” secular legal principles. It is to
employ standard property and contract doctrines to the relevant
documents setting the assets’ status.267
When a church closing is at issue there is hardly doubt that both
these approaches allow an archdiocese to proceed with its plans.268
The Catholic Church is the prototypical hierarchical organization,
and it is also the properties’ owner according to secular principles.
Thus traditional legal analysis of church property controversies pays
scant attention to the interests of community members. Commenta265. See, e.g., James Barron & Jennifer Lee, After Vigil to Protest Church Closing, Six
Women Are Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at B2; Vigil Ends as Police Seal Boston
Area Church, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at A13.
266. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). For a review of the cases, see Kent
Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1846-55 (1998).
267. For an analysis of the approaches, see Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes:
Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 348-57 (1986).
268. See Akoury v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 271 (Mass. 2004).
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tors share this bias. In prescribing standards for church property
disputes, the only individuals whose intent and reliance is mentioned
as meriting consideration are those who donated money to the purchase and upkeep of the specific church.269
This legal attitude is too restrictive. Part II of this Article suggests
that the community aspect of church properties ought to be acknowledged. This goal can be attained if courts, in applying ”neutral” standards to church property disputes, identify and enforce implied
agreements between members and the church. Over the lifespan of
the parish an implied agreement comes into being, encompassing an
understanding that the church will, at least to some extent, protect
parishioners’ reasonable expectations. The agreement implies that
closing a church will only be the solution of last resort, and that the
community will be supplied with an alternative place of worship.
Progress can also be made if courts categorize churches’ governmental structure as congregational more liberally. Since courts must
avoid religious doctrine, there is little barring them from setting their
own secular criteria for defining a local church as an empowered congregation, even when the church’s doctrine requires otherwise.
2. Sports Teams
For many, sports teams are an indispensable component of their
community and an important part of their identity. 270 As noted elsewhere, “[f]or better or ill, a cultural hallmark of our era is the truism
that almost any community’s most visible and cherished asset is a
local major league professional sports franchise.”271 Yet most sports
teams are private properties that can easily relocate.272
This reality bluntly ignores teams’ roles in constituting communities, fans’ attachment to them, and fans’ contributions to a team’s
reputation. Several legal solutions have been proposed for these problems. First, there is the community-owned team model. The National
269. See Greenawalt, supra note 266, at 1865; see also Catharine Pierce Wells, Who
Owns the Local Church? A Pressing Issue for Dioceses in Bankruptcy, 29 SETON H ALL
LEGIS . J. 375, 389-95 (2005) (examining the impact of donations on a church’s ability to
declare bankruptcy).
270. See MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE MEANING OF SPORTS: WHY AMERICANS WATCH
BASEBALL, FOOTBALL, AND BASKETBALL AND WHAT THEY SEE WHEN THEY DO 33 (2004).
271. Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocations
from Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competition,
League Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REV. 57, 57 (1997).
272. The ability to restrict the mobility of sports franchises is limited by law. NFL policies restricting franchise relocation violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). The situation of baseball teams is
different since the Court exempted them from the Act. See Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof'l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); see also Jeffrey Gordon,
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption and Franchise Relocation: Can a Team Move? 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1201, 1213-21 (1999) (discussing baseball’s antitrust exemption).
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Football League’s Green Bay Packers is incorporated as a non-profit
organization, whose shares are owned by fans. 273 Another possible
solution is limiting teams’ ability to relocate and obliging relevant
approving bodies to consider the implications for the community.274 A
third proposal is to award a team’s home city trademark rights in the
team’s name, logo, and colors.275 Finally, there have been failed attempts at acquiring by eminent domain the property of a sports franchise contemplating a move.276
All these proposals raise serious issues of law and policy. However,
they all evidence a belief shared by many that private sports teams
have a community aspect.
3. Other Examples
The community interest in the preservation of its culture and architectural history may serve as justification for historic preservation
legislation. 277 Cultural heritage is created by the community and
helps define it. Consequently it deserves protection.
Even in non-historic districts, buildings’ façades are important to
neighborhood life and confidence. The maintenance of the neighborhood’s appearance presents a collective action problem. Thus statutory obligations placed on homeowners to renovate their buildings’

273. See Lynn Reynolds Hartel, Comment, Community-Based Ownership of a National
Football League Franchise: The Answer to Relocation and Taxpayer Financing of NFL
Teams, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 589, 593-95 (1998).
274. See Gordon, supra note 272, at 1259-64.
275. See Alvin B. Lindsay, Comment, Our Team, Our Name, Our Colors: The Trademark Rights of Cities in Team Name Ownership, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 915, 936-61 (2000).
In one recent case, parties arrived at this solution by agreement. Ending litigation initiated
by the city of Seattle seeking to stop the relocation of the local professional basketball
team—the SuperSonics—the team owners agreed in a settlement that though they will
retain the rights to the SuperSonics’ name, colors, and logos, they will not use them after
moving to Oklahoma City. If a new National Basketball Assocation team arrives in Seattle,
the owners will turn over those rights to the new team’s owner at no cost. In addition, the
team left behind all banners, trophies, and retired jerseys. Jeff Latzke, Seattle to Retain
SuperSonics
Banners
and
Trophies,
SEATTLE
TIMES,
Aug.
20,
2008,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nba/2008127774_websoni20.html. A similar agreement was reached in 1996 when the original Cleveland Browns left for Baltimore, where
they became the Ravens. In an accord with the city, the National Football League allowed
the city to keep that team’s name, colors and records, for use by a new promised team,
which entered the league in 1999. Jon Morgan, Deal Clears NFL Path to Baltimore, THE
BALT. SUN, Feb. 9, 1996.
276. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 741 F.2d 954
(7th Cir. 1984); Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Balt. Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278
(D. Md. 1985); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982); City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986).
277. See generally Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the
Law of Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1981).
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exteriors might be justified (lower income owners should be provided
financial support to enable them to abide by such obligations).278
Finally, for more than three decades now, banks have been subject
to a statutory duty to meet their communities’ credit needs.279 Said
legislation was introduced to combat redlining (the practice of denying credit to certain, mostly poor and minority, communities) and
to force banks to reinvest in communities from which they obtain deposits. It is based on a belief that banks are obliged to serve their
communities: that they are not merely market actors, but entities
that carry societal duties.280 Though the law’s efficacy is debatable,281
it reflects a conception of financial institutions imbued with a community aspect.
C. Stigma-Based Nuisances
A nuisance is “a substantial and unreasonable interference with
the use or enjoyment of land.”282 Courts have stated that a diminution in property value, standing alone, does not constitute an actionable interference.283 Thus, if, for example, an owner discharges hazardous waste contaminating a neighbor’s land, she may be sued for
nuisance. But if the hazardous waste does not reach the neighbor’s
land, yet public perceptions stigmatize the area educing a diminution
in the land’s value, the situation becomes more complex. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains, the tort protects the owner’s interest in “[f]reedom from discomfort and annoyance while using
land[,] . . . freedom from physical interruption with his use[,] . . . [and]
freedom from detrimental change in the physical condition of the
land itself.”284 Stigmas do not cause discomfort and annoyance, nor are
278. Many cities require owners to maintain the exterior façades of their buildings in a
safe condition. See generally BUILDING FACADE MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND INSPECTION 344 (Jeffrey L. Erdly & Thomas A. Schwartz eds., 2004). In Israel the city of Tel-Aviv went
beyond mere safety concerns and adopted an ordinance forcing owners to renovate a building’s exterior every fifteen years. Ranit Nahum-Halevy, Tel Aviv Landlords Now Required
to Renovate Buildings Every 15 Years, HAARETZ.COM (July 13, 2010),
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/tev-aviv-landlords-now-required-to-renovate-buildingsevery-15-years-1.301585.
279. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2006).
280. Wendy Cassity, Note, The Case for a Credit Union Community Reinvestment Act,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 349-50 (2000). But see A. Brook Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431 (1995) (arguing the Act is better explained by principles of individual equality).
281. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment
Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 294-97 (1993); Lawrence J. White, The
Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281, 281-87 (1993).
282. SINGER, supra note 148, at 305. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09-45-255 (2010); see also
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696-97 (Cal. 1996);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
283. See John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265, 299 (2001).
284. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. b (1979).
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they physical interruptions. At the most, they may cause emotional distress, but the Restatement holds that the tort is not addressed at protecting the owner’s “interest in freedom from emotional distress.”285
Courts are thus mostly hostile to nuisance claims arising from
stigmas not accompanied by physical damage.286 For their part, commentators are spilt on the topic. Some believe that damages should
be awarded as owners suffer economic affliction because of stigmas.287 In
contrast, others claim that stigmas are prone to transformation as public perceptions shift, and therefore plaintiffs may not suffer any financial harm; seeing that by the time they sell their houses the stigma
might subside, owners’ claims for such damages are speculative.288
The problems accompanying stigma-based nuisance claims relate
to many of the topics discussed in Part II of this Article. The social
origins of market values, the role of perceptions in setting housing
market trends, and stigmas’ negative influences on communities are
connected to the review of the community aspect of property. It is
thus likely that the policy proposal put forward in Part III of the Article will partially solve the problem of stigma-induced property devaluation. When the fair market values of properties in a certain
community drop, residents will receive property tax abatements. The
decrease’s cause may be neighborhood change, but it may also be
stigmas. Providing residents of neighborhoods affected by stigmas
such compensation may replace nuisance awards.
This scheme acknowledges the damage suffered by residents and
is sensitive to stigmas’ devastating effects on communities. In this
last regard it follows the cue of courts that have become aware of the
dire prospects facing affected communities. Some courts tend to be
more receptive to nuisance claims based on contamination stigmas
when plaintiffs succeed in tying property devaluation “to a general
loss in community quality of life caused by a particular source of contamination.”289 Another advantage of the plan promoted in this Article is that it only awards residents compensation for as long as the
stigma actually impacts the neighborhood: when its effect subsides,
values will re-stabilize and taxes will cease to be subsidized. Thus the
285. Id. In the past, courts accepted claims for nuisance based on emotional anguish,
especially those concerning the operation of funeral homes and prostitution houses. Courts
have mostly retreated from such holdings. See Michael D. Riseberg, Comment, Exhuming
the Funeral Home Cases: Proposing A Private Nuisance Action Based on the Mental Anguish Caused by Pollution, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 557, 574-78 (1994).
286. See SINGER, supra note 148, at 319.
287. See, e.g., Alex Geisinger, Nothing but Fear Itself: A Social-Psychological Model of
Stigma Harm and Its Legal Implications, 76 NEB. L. REV. 452, 496 (1997); Jennifer L.
Young, Comment, Stigma Damages: Defining the Appropriate Balance Between Full Compensation and Reasonable Certainty, 52 S.C. L. REV. 409, 423-24 (2001).
288. See E. Jean Johnson, Environmental Stigma Damages: Speculative Damages in
Environmental Tort Cases, 15 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 185 (1997).
289. Geisinger, supra note 287, at 467.
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program mollifies the main concern of compensation’s opponents—
the fear of damages awarded to residents suffering no harm.
It should be noted, however, that this solution will not deter the
original producers who created the pollution generating the stigma.290
They will not be burdened with the compensation costs associated
with stigma damages—a task that will be undertook by government.
Since the polluters will be liable for the physical damages they caused,
regardless of any stigma damages, it is not clear that such extradeterrence is needed. The public, on the other hand, which did not
produce the pollution but generated the stigma, will be “deterred.”
Thus, the duty to subsidize taxes in declining neighborhoods creates
incentives for authorities to better educate the public in an effort to
combat misguided stigmas.
D. Intellectual Properties
1. Copyright
“Why buy a Vermeer when a Metsu is available?” The eminent art
historian Francis Haskell argued that this “question, which may
sound odd today[,] . . . would have been natural enough in 1800.”291
In the twenty-first century Johannes Vermeer is a superstar, while
his countryman and contemporary Gabriel Metsu is only known to
dedicated art lovers. Yet for the first centuries following their
deaths, the situation was reversed: starting in the early eighteenth
century Metsu became one of the most celebrated artists among collectors and critics, while Vermeer slowly lapsed into near oblivion.
Vermeer’s modern rise, and the ensuing reversal in the artists’
critical fortunes, is largely due to a few exhibitions and a heap of
publications, including a best-selling novel. 292 The current comparative stature of the artists “says more about our taste than the
artists’ paintings.”293 Since their creation in the seventeenth century, the paintings have not changed. The transformation in their
relative stature reflects the arbitrary nature of art-world popularity.
290. On liability’s role in achieving optimal levels of deterrence, see STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 178-204 (2004).
291. FRANCIS HASKELL, REDISCOVERIES IN ART: SOME ASPECTS OF TASTE, FASHION AND
COLLECTING IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE 21-23 (1976).
292. The only time when the two artists’ reputations seem to have been more or less on
par was during their own lifetime. Illustrating the changes in later centuries Adriaan Waiboer writes: “Whereas Le Brun needed the epithet ‘in the manner of Metsu’ to raise Vermeer’s profile in 1792, present-day taste requires phrases such as ‘in the age of Vermeer’ in
order to promote paintings by Metsu.” Adriaan E. Waiboer, ‘Why Buy a Vermeer when a
Metsu is Available?’ The Relationship between Two Dutch Genre Painters, in GABRIEL
METSU 29, 50 (Adriaan E. Waiboer ed., 2010). For more see id.
293. Id. at 50. “It reflects our modern penchant for streamlined and stylized aesthetic,
as evidenced by contemporary design and architecture.” Id. This preference contrasts that
which dominated during the artists’ lifetime, when people preferred works with a “decorating richness” of objects. Id.

820

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:759

What changed was not the works, but rather the public perception
of them.
Intellectual creations, such as Vermeer’s works, have an inherently social character, and thus the discussion of the community aspect of property applies to them. The value of protected intellectual
works is created to a large extent by the community, and not merely
by the creator’s talent.294 At the same time, these works are a constitutive element of the community and its culture.295 These observations help explain the limitations law places on copyright protection.
First, a major exception to copyright is the fair use doctrine, which
exempts some otherwise infringing uses under a complex calculus
involving multiple factors.296 Some courts were willing to give substantial weight to the public interest/benefit under the first fair use
factor, “the purpose and character of the use.” Some courts appealed
directly to “public interest” while others folded “public benefits” into
other concepts such as “transformative use” or “parody.”297 Commentators have further suggested that the greater the work’s relationship to the community’s shared values, the greater the need for public availability. In such cases, and despite rulings to the contrary,298
the fair use defense, so it has been argued, should be stronger.299
Another restriction placed on copyright is the temporal limitation.300 A justification for this limitation can be found in the community aspect of the work. As Vermeer’s case demonstrates, the farther
we move from the original creative act, the more likely it is that the
work’s continuing success is due to factors unrelated to the original
creative labor.301 As time goes by, it may well be that a work’s success
“owes . . . more to the contributions of society . . . in imbuing [it] . . .
with certain meanings.”302 Furthermore, as time passes, works begin
the passage from pure products of creative expression to objects that
are part of the community’s collective cultural history.303

294. See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV.
1197, 1237-38 (1996).
295. See John H. Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CALIF. L. REV.
339 (1989).
296. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
297. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); SunTrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); American Geophyiscal Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (3d Cir. 1994); Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
298. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
299. See Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532,
1586-87 (1989).
300. Today, in most cases, copyright protection lasts for 70 years after the death of the
author. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
301. For an economic approach to the issue, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003).
302. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 446 (2002).
303. Id. at 441-42.
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Another field of copyright law where the community interest is
relevant is the artist’s moral rights. Moral rights confer on the artist
entitlements relating to the meaning, representation, and attribution
of the work even after she has relinquished title to either the physical object or the copyright in the work.304 Though mainly justified in
reliance on personhood theory and the bond between the artist and
her creation,305 some moral rights, especially the right of integrity,
play a social role in preserving art for the community’s benefit.
Clearly, for instance, there is a public interest in preventing the
owner of a Rembrandt painting from destroying it.306 By carving an
exception to the property owner’s ability to modify or destroy the
artwork she owns, the right of integrity assures the safeguard of cultural properties.307 The social nature of the protection guaranteed by
the right is demonstrated in several state moral rights statutes. California’s law, for example, was named the Art Preservation Act, and
declares a dual purpose—communal and personal.308 This recognition
of the moral right’s community aspect has an operative meaning:
the Act allows public interest organizations—and not only artists
themselves—to commence actions for injunctive relief to preserve
works’ integrity.309
The right of integrity is also, to some extent, protected by the federal Copyright Act.310 However, the protection of the community in-

304. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 235 (1972). The moral rights include the right of integrity,
the right of attribution, the right of disclosure (i.e., the right to decide if and when the work
should be presented to the public), and the right of withdrawal (i.e., the right to remove the
work from public eye). Sometimes the rights are defined and distinguished differently. See
3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01[A] (rev. ed. 2010).
305. See Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 41, 42-45 (1998). See generally Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A
Common-Law Basis for the Protection of Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988).
306. See JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS
IN CULTURAL TREASURES (1999); Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment
as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 421 (1986).
307. Eric M. Brooks, Book Note, “Tilted” Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral Rights
After U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1431, 1434 (1989). A
counterargument can be made: the public interest may call for the freedom to alter the
work. This argument, however, is much more forceful when the right of integrity is applied
to the intellectual work, as opposed to its physical embodiment. My focus, as can be seen in
the text, is on the latter: on prohibiting mutilation of the physical object. While it is conceivable that the public may benefit from a freedom to make changes to an object (e.g., in
the case of public art or alterations to an architectural work), the benefits of integrity in
this context are likely to, more often than not, outweigh these.
308. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (Deering 2011).
309. Id. § 989.
310. 17 U.S.C. § 106A, allows the author of “a work of visual art” to prevent modification of her work only if it is intentional and would be “prejudicial to . . . her honor or reputation.” 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006). It also allows her to prevent the destruction of the work,
if it is “of recognized stature.” Id. For a discussion of the role of the notion of a public stake
in protection of important works of art in the legislative history, see JOSEPH L. SAX,
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terest afforded by the moral right of integrity is not absolute: as the
moral right is personal, it is limited in time,311 and, furthermore, the
community’s interests and those of the artist may diverge.312 A famous example is the order the author Franz Kafka gave his friend,
Max Brod, to destroy his unpublished works after his death.313
A related element of copyright law that can be tied into the current discussion is the droit de suite. This right “provides that an artist shall share in the profits accruing to subsequent purchasers from
the appreciation in value of the artist’s work.”314 The right is recognized only in California.315 It can be constructed to further promote
the community interest in the work. In fact, it can be made the
equivalent of the taxation of profits from selling residential units,
proposed in Part III of this Article. The discussion of the community
aspect of property implies that much of the increase in the work’s
value is due to society’s labor—not the effort of the artist who is currently accorded the benefit of droit de suite. Thus, perhaps droit de
suite should be redesigned to make royalties payable to a public entity promoting public access to art.316 When considering such a proposal, its effects on art dealers’ and collectors’ incentives should be
considered. Furthermore, it should also allow for compensation to
collectors who sell works at a loss, as did the program put forward in
Part III of the Article with regard to sellers of houses.
The role of collectors calls attention to one more manifestation of
the community interest in copyrighted works. If the work is to some
degree a creation of the community, and if it is a constituent part
of the community, rights of public access to works—even when privately owned—should be assured. This suggestion has already been
made elsewhere.317

PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHT IN CULTURAL TREASURES
25-26 (1999).
311. According to § 106A(d) of the federal Copyright Act, it lasts for the duration of the
author’s lifetime.
312. See Nicole B. Wilkes, Public Responsibilities of Private Owners of Cultural Property:
Toward a National Art Preservation Statute, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 187-92 (2001).
313. Luckily, Brod disobeyed. See Douglas E. Litowitz, Franz Kafka’s Outsider Jurisprudence, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 103, 115 (2002).
314. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 551
(6th ed. 2002).
315. The author of a work of fine art is entitled to 5% of the profits of any re-sale of her
work, provided she “resides in California or the sale takes place in California.” CAL. CIV.
CODE § 986(a) (Deering 2005).
316. In California, if the owner of the work cannot find the author when she sells the
work, the royalty due is paid to the state Arts Council for use in acquiring fine art. Id. §
986(a)(2)-(5).
317. See SAX, supra note 310, at 65-68. For a critique of Sax’s proposal, see Jason Y.
Hall, Who “Owns” a Cultural Treasure?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1863, 1869-70 (2000) (book review).
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2. The Right of Publicity
The right of publicity, recognized in more than half the states,318 is
the right a person, mostly a celebrity, holds to control the commercial
use of her persona—her name, appearance, and voice.319 Courts and
scholars have debated the justifications for the right’s existence.320
Michael Madow made an interesting argument against it:
Fame is a “relational” phenomenon, something that is conferred by
others. A person can, within the limits of his natural talents, make
himself strong or swift or learned. But he cannot, in this same
sense, make himself famous, any more than he can make himself
loved. Furthermore, fame is often conferred or withheld, just as love is,
for reasons and on grounds other than “merit.” . . . [T]he reason
one person wins universal acclaim, and another does not, may
have less to do with their intrinsic merits or accomplishments than
with the needs, interests, and purposes of their audience. . . . [T]he
canon [of great names]—literary, scientific, cultural, even athletic—
is in fact a “socially constructed reality,” not a “law of nature.”321

This argument is similar to this Article’s claims regarding the community aspect of property. The discussion concerning the creation of
value in Section II.C.2.ii. illustrated that all properties’ values are
social constructions. Madow’s depiction of the origins of fame is persuasive. Yet, as seen, publicity is not wholly different from other assets in this respect. The case against the labor-desert rationale for
the right of publicity, when framed in such terms, can be reiterated,
even if only to a lesser degree, against other property rights.
3. Patents
Copyright law, as seen above, considers the public interest in the
protected work in some instances, but it is still mostly attached to the
primacy of the contribution made by the original owner. Patent law
moved closer to a more cumulative, collaborative conception of crea-

318. See J. Thomas McCarthy & Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete’s Identity:
The Right of Publicity, Endorsements and Domain Names, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195,
199 (2001).
319. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1328-30,
1335-38 (2002).
320. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573-76 (1977) (discussing the differences in state interests and the degree of intrusion on dissemination between
“false light” and “right of publicity” cases); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973-76 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing the various economic and noneconomic justifications for the right of publicity); Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy,
Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979); Alice
Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383 (1999).
321. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 188 (1993) (citation omitted).
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tion in granting some protection to improvement patents.322 An inventor adding an improvement to an existing patent can patent her
improvement (assuming it meets the threshold for patentability)
even if it infringes upon the underlying patent.323 But the new patent
does not privilege the infringement on the original patent. Since the
material covered by that original patent is put to use by the new patent, the original owner may block the improver from using the new
patent. At the same time the original owner is also blocked from using the improvement—which is now patented by the improver. The
result is known as “blocking patents.” The only way for either of the
parties to benefit from the improvement is by striking a bargain. This
arrangement contrasts with that which by and large prevails in copyright law: there, the original owner is bestowed with exclusive rights
over future alterations to the work.324 The approach adopted by patent law relates to several of the arguments made in this Article. The
value of the asset—the improvement patent—is perceived as the
product of the work of several individuals and not only the original
patent owner. Rights in patents are accordingly assigned in a manner that seeks to promote efficient bargaining between the different
contributors and to incentivize behaviors that avoid the detrimental
effects of individualistic decisionmaking on joint production. The
community aspect of ownership, as seen in Part II.B, aims at a similar goal.
Another relevant analogy from the field of intellectual property
law is presented by proposals for replacing law’s exclusive rights regime with a reward system.325 A reward system decouples the question of the creator’s compensation from the question of the scope of
protection awarded to a work. It assures the creator remuneration
deemed fair by society, without granting her the full ability to control
the use of her work by other members of society. Even more than existing rules, it allows society to strike a balance between the interests
of the individual owner and those of other members of society. It does
so by dislodging, at least to some extent, the traditional property

322. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997). I am grateful to Oren Bracha for drawing my attention to this issue.
323. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”).
324. Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act grants the owner of a copyrighted work the
right to control “derivative works.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006). Section 103(a) provides that
only the owner of the underlying copyrighted work can copyright any original contribution
made in the creation of the derivative work. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
325. See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes,
56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to
Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003); Steven Shavell &
Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001).
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rights-based market pricing mechanism. A reward system is, in this
respect, very much like the argument made in this Article about the
social aspect of rights heretofore read as primarily individual.
V. CONCLUSION
“This is the beginning—from ‘I’ to ‘we.’” John Steinbeck, The Grapes
of Wrath.326
We live in an era of constant change. Technological progress, globalization, and an array of economic and social developments have
contributed to the creation of a society where everything and everyone must keep upgrading themselves or be left behind. Against this
background, it is easy to believe that law, in order to remain loyal to
its commitment to freedom, should concentrate its efforts on facilitating the ability to progress, change, and evolve.
This Article strived to show that, at least with regards to housing,
this perception is mistaken. It proved that different theoretical
frameworks converge on one conclusion: community stability must be
preserved. Property rights should be subjected to a community interest. In order to breathe life into this theoretical insight, the Article
suggested instituting the community aspect of property, a device
making the option of leaving a neighborhood less attractive, thereby
helping keep communities intact.
However, “[n]one of this is any guarantee against the erosion of
the underlying communities or the death of local loyalties. It is a
matter of principle that communities must always be at risk.”327 The
aim of the community interest is to allow us to reach the middle
ground, not to bring about a move from one pole—absolute mobility—
to the other—absolute rigidity. The community interest is to be
molded in keeping with one of property law’s main social functions: to
establish “a compromise between the desire for change and the desire
for stability.”328 The community interest in property will render the
departure from a neighborhood less attractive—but not impossible. It
will not turn property law upside down. It will only make it more responsive to the needs and desires of actual owners.
Property law should lend a hand to Ms. Rodriguez and the many
others who aspire to preserve communities they have come to cherish
and regard as part of not only their ownership interests, but also
their lives. This is by no means a desire felt only in gentrifying or declining neighborhoods, though it becomes more pressing in times of
community crisis. We all want stability. Yet absolute stability is un326. JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 152 (centennial ed. 2002).
327. Walzer, supra note 30.
328. JOSEPH SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF
OWNERSHIP 30 (2000).
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attainable; furthermore, it is paralyzing. A balance must be struck:
between stability and mobility, between safeguarding the status quo
and making room for transformation. This Article proposed injecting
a greater degree of stability to property law and community life, since
currently, while very much attentive to needs for change, law does not
always devote enough attention to complementary needs for security.

